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WHY KANT IS PASSING

By G. STANLEY HALL.

For years I taught Kant, making him the focus to which all previous lines converged and from which all later ones diverged, and even devoted an whole year of seminary work to him. His historical importance will always remain very great. When the later systems declined, philosophy went back to Kant to re-form its lines. The Kant etymologists were exegetes of his very words. He was thought to have saved the world from the skepticism of Locke, Berkeley and Hume, and almost up to the present all thinkers must define their relations to him. But in the last two decades or so there has been a great change, even in his own land. A modern introspectionist, who holds that will is partly temperament, sits in his chair at Koenigsberg. The movement represented by *Logos* tones down his dogma to something very like literature. Some who have taught him with unction in the past have found him wanting and pronounced against him. Schurman just before laying down his professional duties, queried the value of it all, and James more than half thought the whole movement he represented a needless detour if not a grave mistake. Laboratory psychology owes him little but obfuscation, and not only introspection but the new logic and even epistemological lubrications, represented by men like Husserl, are finding out many most un-Kantian things. Fechner tried repeatedly, but was never able to understand Kant, and Hartmann called him "*der alte Confusions-rat*," the arch sophister of modern, if not of all times, the exposure and refutation of whom became almost the master purpose of his life. Years ago Trendelenburg and Kuno Fischer waged a violent, not to say vituperative warfare as to what he really meant by his *Ding-an-sich*, and Fichte's system was built upon what Kant protested was a cardinal misunderstanding of his meaning. All who differ are always charged by those who agree, with ignorance of him. With the twentieth century the Kant-cult has rapidly fallen off, even in the Fatherland.

Bergson, who owes so much to him, has practically abjured, Cohen is turning to other things, Avenarius is in the mid-stage of apostacy, and Vaihinger (in his very unique and almost inspiring German type of pragmatism),¹ has, although he paused twenty-five years after it was written before publishing it, given us one of the freshest and most inspiring of all departures from Kant and shown American and English pragmatism a new, if not a better way. Eucken long since began to drift from his Kantian moorings. Royce was too deeply enmeshed to do so but compensates by making delightful excursions into outlying realms. Münsterberg's Kantism is like a creed—a brief expression of basal youthful convictions in and sometimes very much out of season, injecting itself into his psychology. If the Kantian epistemology is, as it seems, the true *Heimat* of his soul, it matters less he is so much and often so far from home. Howison's Kant is uniquely infiltrated with Leibniz; while to the late W. T. Harris, Kant was never more than a minor prophet of Hegel. Garman used his Kantism in a masterly way, somewhat as Socrates did his dialectics, to convince youth of ignorance, to make them feel helpless and receptive so that they would follow the more docilely the way out that he had prepared for them. Six American realists, after various conferences, sought to formulate their creed in a way to minimize the long standing differences in the central Kantian field. Of their success each must judge for himself.² Russell, of England, agrees that relations are external; and this is the core of the new realism. Thus they, too, step out of the magic circle of Kantism. Even Cohen says (*Logik der reinen Erkenntnis*, Berlin, 1902), that, as more than thirty years ago he began the reconstruction of the Kantian system, he was astonished to find "that the understanding of its fundamental ideas had been lost, or rather had never been attained," that he believed that he must understand him better than he understood himself and that the sad issue of original philosophies since could be explained only by the fact that they had lost their orientation to Kant and "totally misunderstood his system, method and terminology." In what follows I have merely attempted to state curtly where and why it seems to me Kant is either wrong or of no further use for us, and to distinguish between what has become anachronistic and

¹ *Die Philosophie des Als Ob*, 1911, pp. 804.

² *J. of Philos., Psychol., and Sci. Methods.*

what has proven really germinal in his scheme of things, and in it all I am thinking not of experts, but of students.³

I. A fundamental trait of Kant's philosophy is the postulation at the outset of the sensory or faculty of intuition which he describes in his transcendental aesthetics. It is an outer or fore-court of the mind through which all impressions from the external world enter. Sense objects are radically different in kind from those of the understanding and must be imaged or manipulated by an elaborate schematism before they can reach the four forms of ideas of the understanding, which is empty until they do so. The first criticism of Kant's Critique is that there is no such faculty as a sensory known to introspection, to pathology, to brain anatomy or to genetics. Neither subjective nor objective psychology today recognizes any such thing and it is a stumbling block in the way of all these disciplines, as much indeed a product of abstraction as any scholastic quiddity or phrenological faculty. The great authority in which its author's philosophy is still held makes this doctrine a formidable foreign body in psychology. Sensation, perception and understanding represent roughly the various degrees of appropriation of apperception, the whole process of which is too integral to be partitioned. The deliverances of each sense are often if not usually far more closely connected with the higher assimilative processes than they are with the data of other senses. Auditory, tactile and olfactory impressions may be understood each with no reference to the other. Even the old doctrine of common sensibles applies to but a few classes of sensations such as sight and touch or to abnormal fusions like cases of colored hearing, photisms and the rest. The senses are for the most part disparate and incommensurable, so that Kant's sensory is a product of the exigencies of his age and has nothing to correspond with it in the soul.

II. The geneticist however can never rest in refutation, but must always find a cause for every aberration from the truth. So here he must ask why the famous Königsberg postulator came to hypothecate such a thing as a sensory. The answer is because, like all epistemologists and idealists, he misprized time, space and matter as he also did sensation. Between Locke who accepted the senses as the only source of true knowledge on the one hand and on the other Berkeley's impeachment of their witness, Kant, like the true arbitrator he always strove to be, gave them the humble yet important

³ See also my paper on Berkeley, *A Genetic View of Berkeley's Religious Motivation*, *J. of Religious Psychology*, April, 1912, p. 137-162.

function of purveyors. They can tell us nothing of the ip-sissimal *Ding an sich*, but they are otherwise veracious. This is the only compromise position possible. The senses are feeders to the understanding and their certainty is sufficient and with that we must be pragmatically satisfied. All they say is true and the mind, a vacant *tabula rasa* before, now reveals previous, undiscernible potentialities. Yet back of all these processes there remains something noumenal, unknown and unknowable, the metaphysical soul of things that the senses cannot grasp or convey. Thus both Berkeleyans and Lockeans, both idealists and materialists, must make concessions and each must admit the partial truth of the other. This was indeed a masterly form of constructive diplomatic accommodation. As a treaty of peace between warring partisans, it showed consummate skill in the construction of its terms, but in drawing it up, current doctrines and not the actual facts of sense experience were considered. It was all dogma and there was no true psychological science about it. Moreover, it was all, artful and covert as it was, in the interests of idealism as was shown by Fichte, Kant's *enfant terrible*, who, by identifying the *Ding an sich* and the self, drew the inevitable logical consequence of absolute idealism. Kant, though no doubt secretly pleased, officially drew back from Fichte as dangerous to his scheme of harmony.

The pact between parties which created this monstrous thing called the sensory had also divorced what nature had made one and inseparable, viz., sense and intellect, and so widely that between them yawned a chasm which in the interest of a decent and common loyalty to the facts of mind had to be bridged. To do this, Kant constructed one of the most fantastical of all speculative creations, his *schemata*, made solely of time aspects, ignoring those of space, viz., the quantitative *series*, the qualitative *content*, the relational *order* and the modal *whole* of time. Through these, the *a priori* concepts of the understanding get their grist to grind. But no experimental or introspective study of the processes of perceiving and comprehending things ever found the filmiest trace of any part of these schemata. They are the pure inventions of this conciliator and concordat maker, now however seeking not to harmonize opposing parties, but to heal a scission or fission which the exigencies of his own previous arguments had caused him to make in the soul itself. Before he had sacrificed psychic facts to harmony. He was now patching together the edges of the gaping wound he himself had inflicted, for the normal soul shows no trace of

any surface of cleavage between sense and intellect, but only perfect continuity.

III. Again, neither time nor space is the proprium of the senses alone, of which only he makes them the categories. He drops space unceremoniously, and strangely and curiously enough takes time to the very gates of the understanding which however it too cannot pass, for according to him both belong to a lower order of psychic truth than do quality, quantity, relation and modality, although from Aristotle down to modern philosophy no one had ever before challenged the place of both these at the regal table of categories. In point of fact, the reign of time and space only begins in the sphere of sense and they constitute almost the master light of all our thinking, however logical and abstract it be. Moreover, it is space and not time that is paramount. The highest, clearest and surest thinking, even imageless thought itself, if such there be, can no more transcend time and space than the bird can outfly the air. Both are implicit in every psychic act. If we once break with these trusty guides, we are at the mercy of any fatuous speculator, for we are in the condition of one who cannot swim and is beyond his depth and clutches at any straw. To give them the supreme place in the lower realm of sense does not atone for banishing them from the lofty realm of innate ideas where they had always been—a realm where they do not but should reign, as Trendelenburg long ago showed, without motion or change or any other dynamic idea, *werden* or development. It is like transition from the warm, moist, vital, growing earth to the cold, arid, dead moon and moreover, no airship of speculation can ever really make such a trip. The true doctrine of the sensory relations that accords with modern psychology and neurology, brushes aside all this Kantian work of sejunction. There need be no gash, therefore no sewing up with clumsy stitches. Sensory processes in fact pervade the entire domain of the understanding. The recent studies of sense have helped us far more to understand understanding than have studies of the understanding helped to understand sense. Modern psychology has tended to give to sense the hegemony over understanding rather than conversely, à la Kant. Aschenbrödel has found in introspection her fairy prince. He has transformed her from drudge to queen, but she comes to her own kingdom with no malice toward even the cruel stepmother who so long degraded her.

IV. But the mesh of Schemata that make it so hard to pass from one to the other, or at least to understand how

impressions get into the mind themselves and are subsumed under the categories, is less intricate than if we take our stand within the mind and proceed downward toward the senses, for this way the maze is still harder to thrid. To apply synthetic judgments *a priori* to sense data, we must use *axioms of intuition* if they are extensive, and *anticipations of perception*, if they have degrees of intensity. That is, we must consider the permanent possibilities of sensation. There must be, third, *analogies of experience* so far as accidents, cause and effect, or reciprocity in time relations are concerned; and fourth, there must be *postulates of empirical thinking*, viz., possibility, actuality and necessity. These and only these judgments we can make, but we must always apply them to objects of possible experience and never to noumenal things beyond that we cannot experience, for the intellect cannot transcend sense because the idealist makes all knowledge only phenomenal.

Categories are the *summa genera* of thought. As the term implies, they were said to have been derived by Aristotle from listening to all topics of conversation in the marketplace, and to be thus products of induction, the highest generalizations from experience. If we took all the themes from encyclopedias, dictionaries, biographies, written and unwritten, etc., etc., and classified them into varieties, species, genera, orders, we should reach a few supreme intellectual radicals like, e.g., the 121 speech roots which Max Müller thought to be the ultimate sources of all words in Aryan languages. In point of fact, however, categories are not thus inferred, but they are assumed postulates and their validity depends upon their applicability. They are not conclusions of induction, but the most advantageous starting points of deduction. As Trendelenburg's classic treatment of their history shows, they are the prime determinants in all systems. Given his categories, you can infer most of a philosopher's scheme of things. They are supposed to shine by their own light like the sun and not by reflected light like the moon. They are the source of all our philosophic seeing. Save for the above dim peripatetic tradition, they have always been taken for granted, given not made, and Kant planks them down with no thought or query as to their pedigree or derivation, a duodecalogue, his twelve Tables of the Law for his *Verstand*. He never dreamed that though innate in the individual, they might be acquired by the race as Herbert Spencer said, nor that they hang together in one organic whole, a diamond network, as Hegel's logic sought to show. They stand forth in the Kantian scheme as

not only underived, but isolated from each other in the region that Locke thought void, and despite Occam's razor, or law of parsimony which taught that ultimates or essences should not be admitted save under the stress of dire necessity. The whole dozen of them (a sacred number by the way) make their *début* veiled and sunk in mystic slumber till awakened from their spell by the incantation of sense experience and then they assert themselves as lords of life and knowledge and at the same time as our interpreters and guides, and yet they are solely logical, noetic, static, without a dynamic principle among them all. Because they are above time and space, they are also above all such concepts as energy, activity, *actus et purus*, while evolution, change and movement have no place among them.

But in fact categories are abstractions and not entities, essences or enneads. They do not preexist in the mind as innate ideas. Their *esse* is *cogitari* as Berkeley said the *esse* of things is *percipi*. They have no existence in the nature of mind but even the best and truest of them are only permanent possibilities of thought. They are not only not metaphysical but not even metapsychological. They are not archetypes, but ectypes. They are psychological phenomena, not noumena. They say nothing and do nothing. They are only highly generalized names for groups of concrete experiences. They are the purely imaginary fetiches of the ideolatrists. They are composite photographs of actual thought processes bundled up into classes. They are not even analogues of the generalized type forms of biology, like the *patrofelis*, father of all the cat tribe, with the general traits of all and the special traits of none of the species that spring from it. Each is only the *flatus vocis* designating the point where concrete empirical thinking in a given domain vanishes into the inane and conversely, the point of departure for a deductive logic that wants a major premise all connotation with no denotation. They are the ghosts of defunct things and thoughts reincarnated by clothing them with sarcous and experiential habiliments. They are little more than the logician's wishes embodied in definitions and that is why they are little less than sacrosanct to their creators. They are the scholastic entities accommodated to post-Lockean fashions just enough to enable them to pass the now relaxed *censur* of Locke's followers. In point of fact, they are probably not entirely imageless to introspection but they always tend to be hypos-tatized and made the most instead of, as they are, the least real of all the creations of human thought.

Again, about all the distinctions implied in the whole Kantian web of them are really made in extremely elementary sense experience. One and many, assent and dissent, reality and appearance, certainty and possibility;—all these are involved in a rhizopod's quest for food. An object is there or not there. It is big or little, truly or apparently there, and it must or may be there; however low in the scale these distinctions of quality, quantity, relation (and mode) respectively, they are not only implicit in elemental activities but perhaps as effective there as in the human domain. Thus, if time, space and objective reality, which Kant would relegate to the sensory, do in fact reach up through all the processes of understanding, so conversely his categories reach down to the sensory of even a rhizopod, to which therefore, we must give his *Verstand*. Very low forms distinguish one or two or more eggs or young, decide between acts or things as if by a rudimentary yes or no, are wary of the appearance of enemies and wise in detecting true and false signs of them and distinguish between the possible and the impossible, as all observations on the simpler forms of instinct and all controlled conditions for the study of trial and error processes abundantly show. These processes animals are performing all the time and perhaps they are no less prerogatives of the brute than of the human intellect. Thus, if a Kant of the animal mind were to arise and give it the honor of a critique, he would have to give it a table of categories, and the clumsy structure of Kant as it stands would perhaps fit them as well as it does man.

Thus limiting ourselves to Kant's very inadequate and antiquated table of categories, three out of four of his groups so factitiously trinalized, viz., those that deal with one and many, affirmation and negation, substance, attribute and cause, if not reciprocity, are objective distinctions which inhere primarily in nature, and only so far as these are apprehended, that is, only in a secondary and derived way, do they inhere in mind. To subjectivize them denatures them. They are independent of all and every intelligence, else science rings hollow and falsetto, for in it we are in fact studying real objects and not studying the mind. The mind is only a medium which has its defects as does the eye, but the interpretations of neither invalidate their objects. Things are things, as sound common sense and the *consensus omnium gentium* considers them and to assume that they are essentially other than we know them hamstrings intelligence. The *Ding an sich* is not even an unknown, but a meaningless

abracadabra, a name for nothing either psychic or physical, a superstition of logic, a creaking of the thought machinery which vanishes when the psychic processes are oiled so as to work smoothly as they should do.

The *judgment* of formal logic, which deals with proposition and syllogism, gave Kant his categories. This was natural in a day when logic was the queen reigning supreme over the whole domain of knowledge, the discipline of disciplines, a complete grammar of thought; when psychology was only a menial handmaiden in the house of philosophy and science was rudimentary and dealt chiefly with non-living matter. His categorolatry is for us a pregnant reminder of the long past day of this enthronement of logic. He sought only to give it the same authority in philosophy that mathematics had for physics and astronomy (which then stood chiefly for science). It has always, from Plato to Spinoza, been the pet foible of speculators to postulate such an organon of sun-clear, primal, *a priori*, necessary truths, from which one could reason *de more geometrico*. But the very fact that no two deductors agree in axioms, methods or conclusions, ought to dispose of this inveterate fallacy. Mathematical categories have universal but speculative categories have attained only the minimum of consensus. Indeed, the muse of the kind of logic that inspired Kant's categories is now only a formal cult, her votaries are few and when and where her voice is at all heard it is in the thin and piping notes of age. His categories thus have no more real authority over the thought of our age than the canons of theoretical aesthetics have in the world of art or the old creeds and theological systems over the religious and moral life of our age. All these linger on in the protected and artificial conditions of academic life but only there. Categories are foreign bodies, interfering with real cultural efficiency. Instead of being organs of apprehension or modes of assimilating sense perception they are strange, nondescript, mongrel products, half platitudes and common places, half artifacts and surds. They cling like burrs well rubbed into the hair and beard in the minds of those indoctrinated but must be combed out, painful though the process be, if we make a good and modern intellectual toilet.

To know things through the media of time and space is, according to Kant, not to know them really and truly but to know them phenomenally and mathematics lives entirely in the realm of the transcendental aesthetics, i.e., in the sensory, for it deals only with time and space relations. In fact all

real things are in time and space but to Kant they are so *for us* and not for and in themselves, so that mathematics concerns itself only with their phenomena. Thus he twice degrades mathematics, once by relegating it to the sensory and again by limiting it to mere appearance. Never was mathematics put so low in a hierarchy of knowledges. But what are the judgments of quantity at least, to say nothing of those of quality, but mathematical, and of the elementary, arithmetical kind, and yet he puts them in the understanding. The later logic of Boole applied mathematics to the domain of quality, relation and mode in defiance of Kant. Affirmation and negation, limit, cause, reciprocity, infinity and possibility—all these now have their calculus and are measurable by this science which Kant makes a subaltern of the sensory. Moreover mathematics now proves that even axioms are not of *a priori* but of empirical origin. Thus, his carefully surveyed boundary between sense and intelligence is not only broken through at every point but is practically obliterated by modern psychology.

The simile of "spelling percepts to read them as experiences" has done perhaps even more than all Kant's arguments to give a certain verisimilitude to his bifurcated theory of noetic origins and processes. It shows Kant a persuasive rhetorician. But a glance shows the fallacy of the conception. Sense data are not late understood symbols but as we have seen, the oldest and truest sources of all that is psychic in the world. To make his simile true instead of like letters he might better have assumed percepts to be like primitive root words or sounds. Again, the child speaks and understands before it reads. True and living speech lies in the aboriginal ear-mouth tract, while reading long-circuits speech to the optical tract and substitutes the dead, artificial, printed page for social converse. In understanding its environment a child does not pick out analyzed sense data, as letters are analyzed phonic elements, and combine them by synthetic judgments *a priori*. By every natural method of teaching reading today he is taught to see the whole word-picture first, and is told its meaning by some one, for he never would have guessed it for himself. The implication that sense data are arbitrary signs like letters and that the epistemologist is the primary teacher of how to learn to read meaning into them is very dear to idealogues, almost as much so as the conception of Socrates that the philosopher is a midwife of ideas. In fact however several German states forbid spelling methods by law and most pedagogues condemn them as mind-

breaking and cruel, and the Kantian scheme is no less anti-natural and false to psychic facts and processes. This illustration therefore can have value only if we make the following preposterous assumption, viz., that the child can and does know language only by means of reading and not before, that it gets all its knowledge from the printed page and that letters themselves represent the elements and give the data of all cognition, somewhat like the chemical elements into which everything can be analyzed. In the letters to be spelled, if this simile of Kant's holds true, all possible knowledge must lie implicit, as the Talmudists thought.

Turning now to the Transcendental Dialectics, which deals with reason, which is factitiously partitioned off from the understanding by containing ideas instead of categories, which forms principles from the ideas instead of makes maxims from concepts, we find reason conceived as the faculty of the unconditioned although it depends upon the judgments of the understanding, somewhat as the understanding depends upon the sensory. Yet although transcendental in its nature and origin, reason must never become transcendent, that is, it must not apply the categories beyond experience or to the unconditioned, because to think is to condition, as Hamilton in his most Kantian chapter later argued. The first false magic lantern picture which reason has always loved to project is that there is a soul or thinking subject. The so-called rational psychology of Kant's day knew much about the soul and made it unitary, simple, undecomposable, outside of space if not out of time, immortal. All we can really get out of the Cartesian *cogito ergo sum* is that thinking is a real phenomenon. But from this to infer to an ego or object to which categories can be applied is a paralogism or subreption and may lead to the delusion of conceiving the soul-self as either matter or spirit according to diathesis or preconception. Why if categories are transexperiential or transcendental in their origin, may they not, for aught we know, be also applied transcendently or beyond experience? Speculators had, indeed, almost universally assumed that these mystic, authoritative categories, strangers of alien origin, may tell us of things beyond the ken of experience, thus correlating their origin and range of application. Psychoanalysis also suggests that they have been so cherished chiefly because they have some oracular and revelatory power of this kind. If, for example, they originated in race-experience, why not apply them as keys to it? Kant, however, denied the transcendental application and should he not also have

denied transcendental origin? Had he acknowledged that they were empirical, as in fact they are, at least phyletically in their origin, he would have had a better warrant to confine them to experience. Why a transcendental origin and no transcendent field? This seems an anomaly in the critical philosophy. The answer is that Kant was even more pragmatist than he knew and even here wiser in practical application than, in his pre-evolutionary days, he could perhaps be expected to be in explaining origins. He saw aright when it came to the uses of categories but followed the easy, traditional way of assuming them underived, as Moses brought down the Tables of the Law. Postulation and hypothecation for him play a rôle not unlike that of myth for Plato. Both were tentative formulae or frescoes on the wall of nescience where knowledge stopped. They were to be accepted by faith, at least pending the advent of knowledge. With his strong evolutionistic tendencies it is almost certain that, had he lived in our day, he would never have insisted upon the transcendentality of the categories, for idealist though he was by temperament and sympathy, he would have shrunk back in anticipation of the transcending use of the categories that became the chief feature of the system of his successors, Fichte and Hegel, who were encouraged to use them thus by his ascribing to them a transcendental origin. To have shown that pure reason can never prove the existence of the soul as a substantial entity, that reason can never reach the *Ding an sich* but can only study its phenomena, quaint as the logical method was by which he arrived at this result, was a master-stroke. But it is almost like Canute sweeping back the tide to evict the bias of hopes and fears regarding a future life that since Kant, almost as much as before him, has both shaped and motivated so much of so-called scientific psychology. The lust to know whether if a man die he shall live again, which Myers says is the supreme problem of all the ages, still weights all the dice and makes us lynx-eyed for every favorable and bat-eyed to every contradictory intimation. It was reserved for the invalid, under-vitalized and academically isolated Kant, who almost immolated himself to his theme and who knew the world he lived in so extensively but only through the dim, second-hand and bloodless medium of books, to waive his own personality enough to make the great renunciation of evicting at least from his cold weird logical reason this all-pervading lust so to construe the soul that it should be made of something which should be at least immortal enough not to be blown away or dissolved

into the elements when "the tides that draw us from the boundless deep turn again home." A less anaemic or frigid nature would hardly muster the virtue to see or the courage to proclaim a soulless psychology. Arguments in general, especially such weird, old logical gearing as his, only give pretexts for believing what one will. We have additional and better ones now for the same agnosticism concerning the soul's entity or substrate and must bravely accept the phenomenality of our psychology in the sense that botany and zoology accept their science without a *biologos* or spirit of life, that physiology dispenses with its old vital principle, and physics accepts matter without being able to define it or energy.

As to the cosmological idea, pure reason can make, we are told, no statements regarding the universe as a whole because for every thesis there is an antithesis that can be no less cogently proven and hence arise the antinomies. Quantitatively we may say the world began in time and has limits in space or conversely that it was eternal and is infinite in extent. Qualitatively we may affirm or deny that everything is compounded of ultimate, simple parts, or that we can never get to absolute simplicity and atoms and even ions may themselves be indefinitely compounded, i.e., matter may be infinitely divisible or there may be a perfect continuum back of all as C. M. Pierce says. Relationally this may be called a world of law and necessity, where causation reigns supreme, or we may postulate freedom which may be itself a true cause. Modally we may urge that all came from something or some being that is absolutely necessary, or again that there is no fate and all is contingent. These four dialectic contradictions Kant uses to show how agnostic man is doomed to be concerning the great autos, Nature, whose Memnonian lips will never open to give answer to any of these questions, however agonizingly and desperately we may shout them into the great inane. We can never penetrate the veil or reach the soul of Nature or even know whether she has any, nor find out what she means by all her phenomena or processes. Science may peer and query but can only answer her own questions by others more subtle. However vast the area of knowledge grows, it is itself still surrounded on all sides by a limiting surface of ignorance which can never be passed. A true philosophy and still more a true metaphysics of nature is thus forever impossible. How epistemologists since have loved to shake this old Gorgon's head in the face of science and tell her what she can do and know and what not with-

out committing the unpardonable sin of "transcending!" On the other hand, how enormously our ideas of the extent of the universe have grown, how it has swelled in time and space to dimensions big enough to be practically infinity, although there is always a beyond for every new frontier, no matter how far it is advanced! Hence, who cares for the difference between astronomical and mathematical space or time, or indeed for anything meta-mathematical or meta-astronomical? We need never feel claustrophobic or shut-in symptoms. So as to divisibility, the thousand ions in an atom of hydrogen are small enough. What difference can it make save for the mania of a paranoiac logic-chopper whether there are indefinitely smaller bodies?

As to the antithesis between causation and freedom, where Kant would non-suit or outlaw both contestants, we are taken into the very different domain of the relation between the cosmos and the human or moral order of things. Here we must continue to investigate and discuss despite Kant's *caveat*. Both contestants have their rights and the practicalities involved are many and great. He might with precisely the same justification taboo the problem of objectivity *versus* subjectivity for the one is just as insistent and yet as insoluble as the other. In fact, Kant himself later in the "Practical Reason" takes his stand unreservedly upon the side of freedom as against law, in violation of his own prescription, and here again he is pragmatic. Partisans who desire to assert either to the entire exclusion of the other are now few if any. Both can be vindicated and each has an ever widening domain and ever stronger case. The whip-row here is not within the cosmological realm but it is between that and the moral order or between Kant's pure and practical reason. These are as incommensurate at least as color and form, if not as vibrations felt by the hand and those felt by the fibres of Corti's arches in the cochlea. The third antinomy is thus a commonplace with no agnostic implication whatever save to those who would cast themselves into the camp of the ultra-materialists or spiritualists. These thinkers constitute a now happily extinct genus. A fresh bumper, then, to the great little apostle of pure reason, the peruked precisian and fence-viewer! Or, more temperately, a fresh sprig of bay on his tomb in bleak, far-off Königsberg, for his help in hastening their extermination, for they are unfit to survive under the conditions of either present-day science or philosophy!

As to the fourth antinomy, whether the world has a necessary first cause or had to be at all, or is a product of chance,

either view can be maintained. Only theologians know or care whether God had to create the world or did it out of caprice, good will or malevolence. From Spinoza who said substance might have had an indefinite number of other attributes than the two it had, viz., thought and extension; and from Malebranche, who revived the old creed that creation is constant preservation, that God is creating the universe every instant and that he intervenes on every occasion when mind and body co-act, to von Hartmann who said the worlds and stars are pimples in a rash with which the divine Absolute Being broke out, and serve to mitigate his transcendent pain or negative eudaemonism, and to those fatalists and materialists who say that from the nebulae to man all the great processional everywhere had to be just as it is and there is at no point any possibility of miracle or of accident:—in the whole genus of ratiocinations of which these are specimens, we never can make the slightest addition to actual knowledge. If Kant only meant to rank all such speculative dreams as the poetry and romance of philosophizing, he did a service. He was in fact an evolutionist so far as the origin of the worlds from nebulae is concerned and doubtless believed in the reign of law over all these processes and if so, all the greater was the virtue of his proclamation of neutrality here and his call to the factionists to lay down arms, or be sentenced to *Banania*.

Lastly, as to God. It was easy to puncture the old Anselmic ontological argument from the conception of an absolute or perfect being to his predication, for we cannot infer from idea to the existence of the object of that idea. *Is* is only a copula and does not assert existence. Conception only involves possibility and not actual reality. If every man who ever lived believed in a God, that would be no proof that he existed, nor if all wanted and felt the need of one, would it argue existence any more than the conception of a fortune or the wish therefor would bring it. We cannot argue from notions to the existence of their objects, for culture history shows that most things that have been universally believed are now known to be non-existent. Again, from the existence of the world or of my own and all other selves, we cannot argue that there is or must have been a most real and necessary cause as real or more so than its effects. We have seen that all might arise from chance and if we require a cause, that would not necessarily involve a God, but force and matter might suffice. Third, the teleological argument for God, or the proof from design or with physico- or natural

teleology, venerable as it is, can at its very best only give us a manipulator of material already created. This contented Kant. But we could now add that the old concept of design which has always been the most bitter and inveterate foe of evolution throughout all history, is now hopelessly and forever shattered by it.

Thus, in fine, reason can never prove the existence of God, still less his function as creator or planner of the world. The idea of such a being is not constitutive but merely regulative and formal. The God-idea may be and perhaps is in itself the summit and crown of human thought, its greatest achievement in fact, but the existence of any objective being corresponding to this idea can never be either proven or disproven. All the certainty there seems to be or is concerning the existence of God or soul or a cosmic order, i.e., whether this is a uni- or a multi-verse, as in Hafid's dream, is solely subjective and we must get on with that and find it sufficient.

With this, Kant's first critique ends. If the field so far surveyed had represented the whole of the soul of man or if Kant had died at this point, he would have been known as the most extreme of all agnostics. Time, space and mathematics are for the first time degraded to the sphere of sense and thus made not only subjective forms, but subalterns. We can never attain true knowledge of anything in their domain and yet this domain we never can transcend. What we have called matter is made up of various congeries of phenomena and appearances and there is nothing more tangible than the ghostly *Ding an sich* back of it all, so that the world is essentially hollow and unreal. Intelligence can only work upon sense data and concerning the nature or existence of soul, natural science or God, we can never know. Never was there such a thorough housecleaning of man's soul. Never were substance and everything metaphysical so cheapened and almost vanquished together with their time and space receptacle. The latter even Berkeley, who subjectified matter, clung to, but psychology as then understood, cosmology and theology (which Berkeley particularly held a brief for) were themselves by Kant cast into the void of phenomenalism he had created. "The rich old world lay shattered and ruined at Kant's feet" (Vaihinger) and pessimism seemed the imminent if not inevitable sequel, for Kant had out-Berkeleyed Berkeley, while in his negative treatment of cause and the ego, he had out-Humed Hume. He accepted all that Locke had said, viz., that the senses are the source of all mental content but cheapened their data, outraged him by equipping

the mind very richly with innate ideas to such numbers and in such a way that the subject is all and the object nothing.⁴ Prodigious as were the powers he gave to the soul in the categories, he shut it away from everything whatever except empirical data themselves essentially unreal. Hence it was no wonder but rather inevitable that his great successors, especially Schelling, Fichte and Hegel broke the walls and let the giant of their Romantic Philosophy loose upon the forbidden grail quest for the transcendental. This is the point in Kant's system where, during his own life and since, earnest truth-loving students have committed suicide because Kant seemed to have robbed them of all that was worth living for—Truth, the Soul, God and Heaven.

Until we reach the transcendental dialectics treating soul, world and God, the Kantian Critique has now little value or interest to students of mind, save a historical one. Yet strange to say, it is just this part that has had chief attention for more than a century since its appearance (1787), while his Critique of the Practical Reason in which his merit culminated was only superficially discussed or apprehended till in our day the Pragmatists have dug up its meaning, fragment by fragment with, however, very scant acknowledgments to the author because they lacked historical sense or knowledge enough of it and its implications to realize that everything they have said or more lies patent or latent in it. In modern Pragmatism, the true Kant has been resurrected; indeed has been for the first time really discerned. It is not creditable to the state of the history of philosophy or to the true knowledge of Kant by English or even German writers and readers of Pragmatism that they stare blankly and even show incredulity when told that it was all in Kant and more and that they have really only begun to exhume his remains, unwinding his cerements or combing out his coiffure as the peignioired Brobdignagians did those of the great Gulliver. At least, to change the trope, they are only shoveling out

⁴ Heine satirized the situation somewhat as follows: The day Kant finished his lectures on the Critique of Pure Reason, his old servant, Lampe, came for him, and as the weather was very bad as usual in far off semi-boreal regions, put on his overcoat, muffler and galoshes, and took him carefully home, holding an umbrella over him, etc. As they went, Kant reflected to himself: "I have executed God, as the French did their Louis, and the English their Charles I, but it is really too bad to rob such a poor creature as Lampe of his God. Even a dog needs a master to look up to as his God." So the great, little philosopher went home and wrote his Critique of the Practical Reason for the poor in spirit.

the soil he loosened. Beyond all comparison the greatest and truest thing Kant told the world was that the will is larger and deeper than the intellect. With him it first began to come to its rights, as the feelings did with Jacobi and Schleiermacher, all of which modern psychology confirms and reaffirms. Kant thus set up a new and higher criterion of truth far above that of the old logic. A new king was proclaimed in philosopherdom whose dominion is to extend even over the whole Philistia of intellect as well. Ethics was seated on the old throne of ratiocination. Conduct is above even noetics. The Kantian epistemology had been so belabored, commented on and its very verbiage so tortured like Sacred Writ by exegetes, although the Critique was written down hastily in a few months with chief attention to its content rather than to its form, that only today have we really begun to read and understand this second and greater Critique in a way that will show, when we see it all in its true perspective, that our Pragmatism is so far only a faint revival of Kant, for all the insolvencies of pure reason were cashed in with interest by the new firm of Conscience and Co. Doing is now the true organ of knowing. Do your duty and you shall know the true truth, was his proclamation. Wisdom is justified by acts and deeds and not by categories, still less by dogma.

The procedure of this new instauration is clear and simple. We must first turn right about face, or invert ourselves as Dante had to do at the lowest hell, at the earth's center of gravity, to be shot out at the other side of it at the foot of the purgatorial mountain. The problem is now no longer how can the pure reason know objects *a priori*, but how can the practical reason determine will *a priori*. We care no more for the cognizability of objects, but only to direct volition or creation aright. We start from moral principles, not from sense intuitions.

The philosophy of conduct thus begins with the freedom of the will, the very existence of which *pure* reason could not prove without meeting the reverse or opposite argument of the antinomy. We have an immediate and ineluctable sense that we could have done otherwise, could do or even think this or that, and these amphibolies are always present. This is the first regulative principle, the constitutive value of which is here subordinate or rather entirely irrelevant. Freedom is the prime fact of man's moral experience. It is immanent in our selves, positive and not transcendent. Here a critique must show its relations to the sensory through the impulses

and inclinations in which it works for these are the sense motives of the empiric instead of the pure will. Now, this empirical will is transcendent and the intelligible is immanent, reversing these relations as they stood in the first critique. The law-giving will must determine itself in, for and by itself, purely and autonomously. Here then we have a new category, the imperative "Thou oughtest." This gives the supreme momentum and sanction of conduct. The lowest momentum from the empirical will is of a different nature, is heteronomous or imposed from without as an alien foreign determinant made up of the desire of pleasure and dread of pain. The former law of oughtness in freedom is universal, constant and necessary, but the algedonic or natural motives are fluctuating and moreover they can never be formulated as binding upon all men in all times and under all conditions. They can only be codified and utilized as maxims. They alone have given content to the will as the sensory does to the understanding. Hence, we must first put them in their most generalized form. When we do so, we attain the precept, "Act so that the principles that determine your act might be universal," so that for all with this rule of conduct there would be no contradiction and least harm and greatest good would be done to the greatest number. Thus utilitarianism is everywhere present, but everywhere subordinate to the higher autonomous oughtness. Hedonism and meliorism are in the inner court of the temple, but not in the sacred adytum itself where the oracle speaks.

What is the impulsion to act purely from within regardless of pleasure and pain? To this question Kant answers, we think wrongly, by introducing a noetic element. We know and revere immediately the moral law which reveals itself within. The awe thus inspired which strikes down self conceit and on the instant subordinates us to its behest is not a sensuous feeling, nor is it pathological or tainted by fear or hope, but it is an "intellectual feeling" of a unique kind, something *sui generis* and unlike everything else in the soul. We feel towards the moral law within the same devoutness that we feel toward the starry heavens without (the legend on his tombstone). The pain of subordination and coercion is exactly balanced by the pleasure of exaltation and expansion. Reverence is thus out of and above the domain of inclination or even love or, on the other hand, disgust or aversion. This rigorism does not imply that a duty can be done only against resistance or against natural inclination.

Here are implications that modern psychology, which in-

cludes ethics, cannot follow, even with the best will to do so. First, instead of a categorical imperative which incites to duty in general, with no intimation of any specific duty, psychology places the simple *nisus* or push up of evolution which says "Excelsior," and impels all to make the most and best of themselves. This is no less venerable or cogent, for it has behind it all the momenta of the whole evolutionary process. It is the *vis a tergo* that impels man ever onward and upward. It is the center of the current of the whole stream of tendencies that has made man man, that flows in the world today and strives to bring in the kingdom of the superman. It dominates and determines all our acts, but especially those we call moral.

Secondly, it is not the Stoic or Puritan conscience alone with its stern demands, with its pleasure-fearing, pain-despising implications and attributes, but it is the Greek chivalric honor as well which impels always to the highest ideal in conduct with loyalty to the race and to the unborn. Though of pagan origin, honor is more genial and humanistic, but it and duty always need each other to impel to the highest good.

Third, the supreme inner oracle of righteousness not only impels but it deters, like Socrates' daimon or the ten commandments. It has a negative which is quite as great as its positive or affirmatory function. A sense of worthiness and unworth, of merit and demerit always go together. The eternal nay is not in the vocabulary of Kant's categorical imperative, although the instinct what not to do is one of the most precious acquisitions in the whole struggle for survival. Do nothing unbecoming the *Übermensch* burgeoning in all of us, nothing against life, health, or virtue. That is, the ideal of the best men and women we might be takes the place of the men and women we are. This is the slogan of the modern evolutionary categorical imperative. This, too, may defy all inclination and demand even the immolation of the self in the interests of the race. Supreme self-sacrifice may be imperative. But even in such extremity, if we are hated, beggared, despised, tortured, we shall have the sublime satisfaction of the *mens conscia sibi recti*. A little of this pleasure once only in a lifetime may outweigh lower and life-long pleasure, as John Stuart Mill said, who would follow his inmost conviction of what was right and good "and if God wishes to send me to hell for this, to hell will I gladly go" and be happy there although he defied the Almighty, like Prometheus chained to the rock for his fire-bringing service to man. Of such metal the highest heroism is made. But

even such supreme self-sacrifice is not without consolation. Hence Kant is wrong. Man may rise far above the always selfish hope of heaven and dread of hell, but the fulfilment of his destiny always brings inner approval and he can almost hear this monitor say, "Well done." Hence Kant's attempt to rise to supernalgedonic regions was a Pegasus flight which is impossible in the world of moral experience and which even the theories of intuitive morals do not need. All that is necessary is to distinguish the motivation of the race from that of the self, phyletic from ontogenetic ethics, for Kant's categorical imperative must and can only today be interpreted as the still, small voice of the race whispering amid all the louder voices of the ego. It says, "Thou oughtest" but to this adds thou oughtest first, last and always, to serve the race, whatever betides thee. Now this brings a unique but entirely supersensuous and superegoistic happiness that is ecstatic and intoxicating. It is the voice in the soul of the power that makes for righteousness.

But next and fortunately, the interests of the individual and the race usually coincide and rarely require the immolation of the former. Most of the deeper and stronger impulses are race-revering and most that really develops the individual and widens his pleasure field helps humanity. Antinomy and heteronomy are by no means always or indeed very often in conflict and so do not need Kant's belabored analytic to connect them. Indeed their harmony amounts almost to identity. We think we act for ourselves when we really are acting for the race. The only misfit modern psychology finds here is that between the also usually coinciding yet sometimes opposed individuation and genesis of Herbert Spencer. Taking our stand upon this instead of the Kantian principle, "Act so that thy maxims will be sound if universally acted on," we now say, "Develop your individuality to the highest point compatible with the most effective increase and transmission of life; be and do all you can to attain the optimum of parenthood." All less than this is defect and all beyond is excess, and on both the gods of generation pour wrath although from different vials. Some may be called upon to hyper-individualize themselves *ad majorem gloriam hominum* or even to offer up their lives, experiencing "all the joy that lies in a full self-sacrifice." These heroes who offer themselves up to the phylum have their own rich meed of honor. But the test of all the ultra-genetic virtues as indeed the ultimate measure of value of home, school, state, church, and all institutions, is service to those who live and

to the unborn who shall spring from our loins. They are all to help us to bear and rear most and best children. This is the sanction of biological as distinct from what we may, borrowing a Kantian phrase, call transcendental morality. Thus virtue has two registers or levels as he taught, although they must now be very differently conceived. The antithesis is not between the sensuously impelled and the free will as he taught, nor between Huxley's cosmic and human order, but between the interests of the individual and those of the race and here we do not have a real bifurcation wherever these do not coincide but collide at whatever angle. The truest tragedy today deals with this struggle and no longer with the collision of two opposed virtues as in the case of Jephthah's daughter, or Iphigenia or other Greek drama motives. Nor do we need the casuistry of the Catholic church where cardinal virtues conflict with each other or especially with those lower in the hierarchy of them, so arranged that the lesser shall give way to the virtue of higher grade. The practical antinomy today is between what is good for the person and what is good for humanity. Into this all other moral amphibolies can be resolved.

Again, the impulsion to follow supreme oughtness is not an apprehension of the moral law in itself by a unique faculty of apperception directed to it alone as Kant taught, nor is it a religious feeling of absolute dependence, as Schleiermacher believed, but a no less unique but different feeling of *kind* or as I would call it in default of a better name, a *sensus numinis hominum*, more impulsive than discursive, more unconscious than conscious, a sense of direction or orientation not as to the individual alone but as to the direction in which the race is going. I admit this is as much beyond the present ken of psychology as are gravity tropisms, which distinguish so subtly and inerrantly between up and down. It is a compass which is not deflected (as it so easily may be) but points steadily toward the unknown pole of ultimate human destiny. Conscience, honor, moral sense and even ethical taste are only partial names for it. It says "Live for the race," and it warns or deters as well as impels. It is the soul of the overman in us, not yet born but striving toward birth through all ages and generations in *saecula saeculorum*, the millennial ideal man of the future of whom all moral struggles are the birth throes, with some phases of which we are occupied in every ethical endeavor and of which the moral history of the race is the slowly progressive nativity.

It is an instinct, impulse, *Trieb*, *nisus* or push up that even

genetic still more any other type of psychology, can not yet name or define. It is not first seen cognitively and assented to, but felt and acted on. It is an *ethos* rather than a *logos*, more *nomos* than the *muthos* in which it is bodied forth. In most acts and throughout most lives, it never comes to consciousness at all. It is more norm than form, from which the sum of consciousness measures the sum of error or departure either actual, conceivable or threatening. Shall we call it the goal of the human species so far as it animates the individual and the sense of direction that pervades the whole journey of life? What is its relation to Providence and is it infallible if heard aright? No one beholds a moral law written within and adores it as astrologists did the starry heavens any more than the bee makes its cell or the spider its web by geometry with appreciation of its meaning. It would take an intelligence as much above ours as ours is above the bee to understand this moral motivation in us as well as we understand that of the bee. Even the greatest specific acts of virtue and heroism are usually done, as von Hartmann says instinct does, viz., "according to a purpose but always unconscious of it." It is a sense of economizing life so as to make and get the most and best possible out of it, as opposed to the prodigal and spendthrift, who squander life on selfish and transient ends. It is thus essentially thumic and not epistemic, these two being somewhat related in the psyche as the spermatic and the somatic in biology. It might clumsily be dubbed an auto-phyleto-philic principle (sense for and love of racial uprightness), but this adjective only designates an essential attribute and not the ipsissimal nature of the impulse.

The moral impulse needs no such analytic or dialectic as Kant subjects it to, because its bottom motif is not *gnosis* but *thumos*, disposition or *Anlage*. The intellect is largely an individual product. Indeed, the intellectual element may interfere with moral practice, knowing with doing. The deliberative element is secondary. In fact, the noetic element is always and by its very nature heteronomous. It involves an object, and objectivization is always heterization, while only autonomy is purely subjective. Virtue impelled by knowledge may be very lofty and almost inspired and actually inspiring but it is always in a second and lower class in the order of moral nobility.

Again, how can freedom, Kant's basal principle, be the foundation of an imperative and that a categorical one, the opposite of freedom? The answer is that this freedom is not

a balance of choice between two or more alternatives but an impulsion that is or ought to be irresistible which nothing in the soul can oppose to keep to the one and only straight and narrow way. It is more like the *non posse peccare* than it is like the *posse non peccare*. It is more essentially impeccable than infallible. We act more wisely than we know and before. We tell why we so acted, if we do so at all, only later and very imperfectly. The virtue that thrills an admiring world springs like the greatest works of art straight up out of the dark abysmal regions of the soul. It is inspirational—from the heart and not the head. We stand in awe and marvel at the native, creative originality in the human soul, for every great moral deed thus impelled is a new thing in the world, a contribution to its moral growth. It is a gift and comes without research or even circumspection. It is new-born out of the great unknown within, beneath and over us. It is thus related to custom (*Sitten*) or morals, a little as the latter is to legalism or codified ethics, the former being one and the latter two removes from it on the scale that measures the grades of implicitness and explicitness.

What is the relation between virtue and happiness as the world knows happiness, i. e., pleasure? As Kant said, the Stoics were partly right, conceiving happiness as the consciousness of virtue, *but* there are pleasures that are not virtues. Also the Epicureans were partly right in conceiving the highest happiness as virtue, *but* much virtue in this world brings pain. The old Hebrew idea was that in a well-ordered moral world righteousness went with pleasure and prosperity meant right doing so that in adversity they examined their consciences, which were thus inflamed. In fact, happiness and virtue do belong together and their union is the *summum bonum*. Now, says Kant, pleasure and virtue do and can never completely unite in this world and so we must postulate a postmortem life in which they are forever one and inseparable. Now this is surely a *tour de force*. On this basis, if the world should ever grow so perfect that the good were happy here and the bad miserable, there would be no longer any need of or argument for immortality to bring them together and a millenium or golden age of this sort, if it ever came, would dispense with a future life for the consummation would be attained here, and to say that they must be united in each person through all eternity is going farther than the argument warrants. Or again, virtue and happiness might be completely united in a posthumous life for a time. Then the consummation would be reached

and life might go out so that we should be sentenced to the reward of heaven for a limited period. But again, is it a psychological fact that all men everywhere do believe that virtue and happiness belong together? Much has been deemed virtue that we now deem vice and there is quite a domain where one man's happiness is another's pain. Moreover, pessimists deny all such relation. To them misery goes with virtue and only optimists are firm in this marriage. Again, some Stoics and Kant himself felt that happiness corrupted virtue.

Once more, Kant's argument only attempts to prove a heaven where a reward is attached to goodness. But does not the instinctive sense of justice exactly as much affirm that sin and woe belong together? Is not this indeed a part of the psychosis that unites goodness and joy so that the belief is incomplete and falters without the former? If so Kant should by the same token have postulated hell as a place of eternal torment.

God, too, he postulates as a necessary being, the cause of both the natural and the moral world, who implanted in us the idea of the union of virtue and happiness and imparts the latter according to these traits of our mind. But who put sin and woe together, as they surely just as much belong, which indeed is only the obverse side of the same fact? Did God do this, or must we not exactly as well postulate a devil to tie these two up by a no less indissoluble bond?⁵ Kant did not say and so his story of the practical reason lacks the

⁵ God and the devil are sometimes conceived a little as running mates or sparring partners, or as twins, but as opposites, chiefs of kingdoms that divide the world between them. These two personages, together with their respective domains, Heaven and Hell, not only bring out each other by contrast, but have so long gone together historically that if one fades the other tends also to do so. To drop the devil tends to a twilight of faith in God. The doom of one foreshadows that of the other, as the dead moon is the death's head, or *memento mori* to earth of its eventual fate; and all devils are deposed, or ex-gods, as dead planets once lived. All this and more, we see if we psycho-analyze Milton's magnificent Satan. Ought we not to rehabilitate and reinstall the Devil? As Beelzebub, he was god of flies, *i. e.*, of bacteria. In the middle ages the *advocatus diaboli* was leader of the opposition, representing the minority. It was felt that God must not have it too easily, all his own way with no conflict, lest he degenerate, or lose virile quality. The Devil had much to do in conserving the theater, dancing, sports, etc., through a time when the church would have annihilated them. Of these the Devil long kept a sprouting garden or nursery against the time of need. As innocent pleasures cease to be forbidden the Devil's kingdom wanes. This the French diabolists strive to buttress up.

tragic side, vital alike for Christianity and for evolution. Or do the bad just die like beasts and is another life attainable only by the good? Nor are we wandering here from the standpoint of the practical to that of the pure reason for punishments are just as practical in the ethical domain as rewards.

So, too, Kant urges that we can know nothing of God whatever except that he is a power that in us inspires the idea that goodness and happiness belong together and later unites them in heaven. To attempt to know more, to know Him as creator, as preserver, as providence, or even as a person, to define any of his relations to time or space, would be to apply the categories magic-lantern-wise or transcendently, the *summum malum* of the pure reason. Hebrew prophets and later theologians went far beyond all warrant in giving God other attributes. If virtue and happiness do not both belong and get together there is nothing in the universe to which we have any warrant to apply the word God, for in the Dialectics Kant had shown the fallacy of all such grounds of belief in him. All scepticism of this junction, *arete-hedone*, involves atheism. No Kantian can accept a future life without a God for these two are for him organic unities. Yet there have been those who urged that there might be a next world and a very excellent one, without any Overlord but just a republic or possibly a social democracy, as they have deemed any and every conception of a God a not indispensable hypothesis for this world.

What, then must the modern psychologist of religion and morals conclude concerning these last two postulates? It is, in sum, that they constitute a sophistical construction that falls of its own weight and has very little warrant in the nature of the soul. Comparative religion knows it not for there are great religions embracing a large part of the human race, like Confucianism, Brahmanism, Buddhism, that know or care nothing of God or heaven. Modern ethical culture, although going back to Kant, has no use for God or heaven and holds that hope of the latter corrupts ethical motives. Moreover, the recent studies of the religious and more specifically of the Christian consciousness tend to incline us to regard both God and heaven more and more as immanent and subjective. Both are a state of mind. Again, if virtue and happiness ought to join and do not here, but do so after death, it seems that this world was so badly made that it had to be supplemented by a revised and sublimated edition to the correction of the fiasco this world has proven to be. Once

more, the categorical imperative gets on without pleasure and pain, is above and uncontaminated by them. The supreme ethical impulsion so needs to be disinfected of pleasure and pain that we can never be entirely sure that we are acting from the purest ethical motive unless duty is at least a little painful. Thus, virtue only becomes completely sure of itself when it sees itself in its nascent state if but for an instant apart from those elements with which it has closest affinity. Yet immortality and heaven exist only to alloy or maculate pure duty with the baser element of happiness and to make the right pleasure-toned. Thus a pure dutyist would scorn immortality and heaven as heteronomous. To accept salvation would taint or pollute his conscience or pervert it from the love of right for its own sake to love of the pay for well-doing, while God instead of being an all-pervasive power within the soul of man and of the world is known solely as the deviser of a scheme of postmortem revision of accounts which makes up for defects in the shining yellow metal of pleasure that is just adequate though it is deferred to a sequel or appendix life, all of which is done to even up misfits in the present life. The Kantian heaven is thus on an inferior and epicurean plane. God is knowable only as a repairer of a moral world that was illy made at first and he mended and tinkered the job which its unknown author had botched, by patching it with material of inferior quality. Thus in fine, the only truth in Kant's God-heaven construction is that these postulates have and will long continue to work well as a system of transcendental rewards (and punishments) to supplement the defects of the sublunary system. Righteousness is always the best policy if we take into account both lives, this one and the next. We can afford to suffer here if only it is usuriously made up hereafter.

On passing from the Critique of the Practical Reason (as he scholastically and epistemologically called the moral nature) to Religion Within the Bounds of Pure Reason, Kant takes still another standpoint and reaches conclusions which it is impossible to reconcile with either of the first two Critiques. Religion, we are told, is founded on morality, not conversely, because fear and hope would corrupt. Morality must lead to religion because the *summum bonum* is a necessary ideal of reason to be realized only through the God-idea. Religion must never first incite to virtue and God and heaven must never be moral motives. Still we have to recognize duty as a divine command and this indeed is the essence of religion which seems *revealed* if our duty at first appears to

us in the form of a divine command, and *natural* if we first find our duty and then postulate it afterwards as a divine command. The church is purely a community of those who would oppose evil and advance good in the world. It is visible so far as it is actually wrought out or attainable, and invisible so far as it stands for an unrealized ideal. The true invisible church must be, quantitatively, universal; qualitatively, pure of superstition, fanaticism and sin; relationally, free, a voluntary state; and modally, unchanging. All must rest on the moral faith of reason, for striving for virtue is all God or the church commands. But human nature is weak and so we must add statutory and historical parts which should be merely the vehicles of moral meaning and are without any validity independently of this. Every dogma, e.g., the Trinity, without moral content is worthless. Moral reason alone can interpret Scripture and whatever of it has no moral significance must be dropped. Of themselves, sacred records are of no more value than myth. The ideal is for the moral faith to slough off all the useless statutory and historical elements. Thus the kingdom of God is approached and when it is reached history will cease. (Thus far Kant.)¹

Against all this, liberal modern ethical theory has nothing to object except this: Kant assumes throughout that the moral faith can make assay of all creeds, ecclesiastical regulations, bibles, church history, etc., and can do so now or at a fixed time or more specifically, that some man or class of men, e.g., philosophers or moralists can do so. This is and will probably remain impossible. When any system allows elements thought for ages to be morally vital to lapse from its consciousness, there is always grave danger, because the folk-soul is so immeasurably larger than individuals, however cultured and gifted or however large a school of men is represented. In fact, all doctrines and traditions ever held were once pragmatically vital and they may become so again. The Immaculate Conception of centuries ago, which now to most seems moral *allogria*, was once vital, so were at certain times and places belief in the resurrection of Lazarus, the conjuring of devils into swine, Jonah and the whale, the sun standing still on Gibeon, the temptation in Eden, etc., but seen now in their true significance and motivation, they fairly glow with ethical light and heat till their patent is forgotten in their latent content and meaning. Man's soul is in all periods vastly wiser than it knows. The Trinity in the sense Kant regarded it was trivial, but its philosophical implications were developed by Hegel later, who made it almost basal. It was

the psychology of centuries projected on the heavens, and theology is now being reconstructed as a precious part of the higher anthropology and heaven as the millennial feature of evolution. Much of Man's dialogue with celestial and infernal powers and personalities is coming to be seen to be in fact only his monologue or soliloquy to himself set off as an imaginary interlocutor. In this new sense we must know God and all supernals rightly to know ourselves. Kant had hardly a foregleam of all that archeology, diplomatology, the higher criticism of the psychology of religion have since done here and hence his mode of dealing with religion is too summary and superficial as well as too logical and mechanically anti-genetic. His intellect was too dry and his soul too wizened to do justice to so vital a thing as religion. His treatise to be sure has had immense historical significance for it loosened the mental soil which theology had trodden down so hard about the religious life and it also provoked the reactions of the warmer hearted Schleiermacher and Jacobi, but in the above, he says little or nothing at all to the modern scholar in these fields and still less to the Christian save what is really elementary and commonplace. We are far beyond all this today and yet there are tyros just awakening to what religion really means and says who need this infant food till their mental teeth are cut. Perhaps the simile of a rubber ring to chew to facilitate dentition would have been better.

Again, religion is more than one specific way of regarding duties, viz., as divine commands. It is not a theory or feeling as to the origin of moral obligation. Kant's argument is that they are not divine and hence religion, as he conceives it, is based on a lie unless indeed this illusion of their celestial origin is only another postulate, false in itself, but justified because it works well to make believe that conscience speaks with the voice of God. If one assumes *vox populi vox dei* would that make public opinion religion and if not, why not? If we regard the flight of birds (Bryant's sea fowl), the inspection of entrails, the marvels of instinct, as God-guided, does it make comparative psychology into a religion? Would Malebranche's occasionalism, which assumed a special creative invention every time soul and body interacted, make all studies of the relation between soma and psyche theology? Is there no true religion without belief in or a theory of God? Is piety nothing but a supernatural sanction of human duty and has Deity no function in the universe save to motivate good conduct in men? In these days of religious psychology to ask such questions is to answer them adversely to Kant,

for it has far transcended the narrow limits he prescribed for it.

Turning now to the third Critique fantastically termed that of the Aesthetic Faculty of Judgment, dealing with the beautiful and the sublime, the term "aesthetic" has its more common art significance rather than designating the sensory field as in the first Critique. First as to quality, beauty must give disinterested satisfaction and it wakes no desire as to the agreeable and the good. There is here no motive to realize anything. Quantitatively, a thing of beauty must please all, although this universal validity is not conceptive but subjective. All these judgments are therefore individual, as to relation; we must feel a general, but not a specific, sense of design; and modally, the satisfaction must seem necessary. The object not only may but must please. Thus all judgments of taste are based more on feeling than on thought.

How false all this is! When we contemplate beauty, do we not either desire to get nearer, more of it, or if it is a work of art, to create it or a better one in the same or in some other field ourselves? The lives of great artists show that the exquisite joy of beholding beauty was often the muse that gave them their first inspiration, and their direction for life. The hedonic narcosis of Schopenhauer is painful and pathological if it does not inspire to create or do. Again, pure passivity in this field is psychologically impossible and perhaps it is in any other. Even the reveries in hearing music are partly of doing, although often in very different spheres. There is no paralysis of will and no *repentance* of desire, but we are at least made to feel better and stronger. We are interested and want to realize.

Nor is it essential that we feel that the object should please all. We know and feel that this picture, e.g., would please children and this combination of colors, savages, etc. The best tastes differ greatly. Cannot I fully enjoy music and yet know that there are those who care not for but are positively pained by it? We wish but do not expect all others to admire as we do. As to relation, the design instead of being essential is, as Helmholtz showed, often a detriment that designates a cheap and spurious art. The very suspicion that the artist planned it all out interferes with the far deeper pleasure that we want to feel and do when we feel that the creation was a spontaneous, irresistible and perhaps unconscious expression out of the very depths of the soul. For thus it makes us feel that the foundations of our being are sound. Thus unpremeditation is one of the great

charms of art. As to the necessity of universal appreciation, do we feel that all not only may but must appreciate the object we call beautiful? If, as Kant says, all these things are feelings and not conceptions, why apply judgments to them. All these are at best only a few descriptive phrases and his hypersystematization here is almost affectation. These platitudes have contributed nothing whatever of value to aesthetics, but have served greatly to retard the day of experimental methods here and have kept this field a tumbling ground of arbitrary individual speculation, often even of romantic constructions which have brought the subject into scientific disrepute. Writers galore have mused and set forth in ponderous tomes their complicated states of mind so long that a few decades ago many felt that this whole region must be given over to dreamland since fantastical, arbitrary and capricious methods and results seemed to dominate.

The *sublime* deals with what is great beyond comparison or indefinite and so is not found in nature, which can only evoke it, but in ourselves. Now, quantity is the chief category, as quality was in judging the beautiful. Whether mathematical or dynamical, we prefer the formless to form. After a negative result of inhibition or a sense of insufficiency, we are impelled to assume a *supersensible substratum* to which we cannot react adequately, even by the imagination. Yet we are pleased to realize that our reason as over against sense can cope with the object. Nature is great, but the soul is superior. Thus quantitatively the sublime is absolutely great, as seen by simple intuition rather than by enumeration or measurement. Qualitatively it pains, then pleases. Relationally, we feel greater than nature and modally, we all must feel the same. Thus all experiences with the sublime are a little harder than those with the beautiful because it brings the negative pleasure of self-subordination. Here, too, the logical mechanism rather interferes than helps.

At this point, the careful reader will probably first think of Kant's starry heavens and the moral will within which he deems the most sublime of all things. Under the above rubrics, the heavens themselves are not sublime for they are only geometrically and dynamically great, that is, they are merely symbols of true sublimity, but if the sublime is within us, why do we feel the initial pain of being insignificant? Modern psychology makes this reductive effect on the self a prime trait of the sublime, which has two directions, one toward what is objectively and the other toward what is subjectively great. The former need by no means transcend all

measurement or be great beyond comparison. It does not detract from Niagara that we know the number of tons of water per hour or a bigger fall in Africa, or from the sun and moon that science can weigh them, or from the stars that we can approximately measure the distance and the size of a few of them. We still feel awe without Kant's absolutism and infinity. Moreover, awe itself has many degrees. It is attuned with fear and hence we feel our insignificance, are depressed and paralyzed, perhaps feel the sentiment of extreme dependence that Schleiermacher made the taproot of religion. To feel awe thus requires certain generous powers of intuition that some seem never for a moment throughout their lives to attain, those namely who never can truly reverence, revere or respect. This involves docility and perhaps in its extreme forms almost a masochistic passion for pure passivity. Desire is instinctive will subjugated to the sense of objective reality to which all is fundamental. It is the subjective idealistic trend of post-Kantian philosophy that has impoverished the treatment of the sublime along with outer causes and has actually weakened this sentiment.

As to the subjectively sublime, our interpretation must to-day differ radically from that of Kant. Of course it inflates the soul well toward megalomania to think and feel that the grandest objects that seem to be without are really within us and that man is the bearer not to say the creator of his universe. But this is only a delusion of greatness. The conviction or sentiment that we are superior to instead of a part of nature gives only a meretricious sublimity. The true feeling comes with the realization that our thoughts, feelings, will, etc., indeed all we do consciously, are determined by the deeper, surer, stronger processes that work in the subliminal depths of the soul. This is a sense of an energy within, not over, ourselves that makes for truth and righteousness. It is the sense that underneath all our endeavors are everlasting arms; that if our frail bark of consciousness and purpose go to wreck, it sinks to a larger sea, that the racial, i.e., all the propulsive tides of heredity are steering us, and ever seeking to come to expression in our lives. The deeply infused sense is that we see, act and feel, etc., with all that all our forbears have seen, acted, felt, etc., and that these instinctive impulses steady and sanify, even if owing to the interferences and battered rectifications and accommodations of consciousness they do not always lead us aright. Let us then reverence the starry heavens above and the psycho-physical heredity behind us as the two primal sublimities, one in

space and the other in time, neither of which need or even can possibly be transcended.

Two other points remain in Kant's aesthetics. First he urged that the beautiful and the sublime give an impelling sense of a supersensible substratum back of the phenomena which evoke it. Essential reality, in fact the *Ding an sich* hidden to the understanding, comes within the range of these judgments, although this is not definite or even demonstrable. The concept of this substratum is always present, though always so vague that we cannot dispute about tastes. It was in carrying this view out that Schopenhauer said that in beauty only we glimpse the blind but basal will to live that makes all the processes of the world go. In the aesthetic domain alone does the veil of Maya lift a little or at least grow thin so that noumena shimmer through. The sense of reality has much to do with overwhelming us when we feel the ecstatically beautiful, or the transcendently great, says Kant. This ipsissimal entity is what is vaguely recognized. These two sentiments then bring us face to face with the metaphysical nature of things. We transcend experience and break through the categories only at this point. The artist passes in where the epistemologist cannot enter. The poet is a seer who can discern what the philosopher or scientist cannot and alone stands in immediate rapport with things as they are.

Our gloss upon this thought:—it is gratifying that Kantians can touch actuality at any point even in matters of taste, almost as if by palpation. The idealist should be very grateful after the long voyages of discovery that unlike Vanderdecken in the Flying Dutchman, he can make a landfall and be blessed, not cursed, for it, even though when upon the solid shore all is foggy and dim about him. But he now has *terra firma* under his feet and it is no wonder that with this only outlet from phenomenalism aesthetics has since tended in this direction as if it were in a hoppo. Here idealists have been impelled to reinvigorate themselves, like Antaeus by touching Mother Earth. Post-Kantians who felt most shut in found this the easiest way of escape and took it. It was thus Kant came to found subsequent philosophical aestheticism. It meant for his followers quite a general jail delivery. It must however be said that they have all together added precious little to our knowledge of anything in this field, least of all to the supersensible substratum. They have gamboled freely about, but always nearby, without organizing any expeditions to explore this mystic region. The little they have told us of the substratum is neither significant nor ap-

petizing. Indeed, they have really done little but exult in their new sense of freedom.

But reality is not the peculiar appendage of the sense of beauty and sublimity. In fact, the reality thus found is mythic as the grail. A sense of the real reality comes from hard up-against-ness of facts such as welfare workers, laboratory people, scientific managers of industry and business know. This kind of reality is the sternest, nearest and commonest of all things and that in Kant's cloudland of the imagination was only a mirage of it. The manual laborer is nearer to the only true *Ding an sich* than the thinker, poet or painter and what the thinker postulates or the artist glows over is only the remote resonance or phosphorescent effect of this kind of long contact with things from thigmotropism up through all our lines of descent generalized and beatified for contemplation. Kant's own diathesis here as everywhere may be described thus: His consciousness shed an unusually bright light and he examined his soul by its aid with great diligence, but his instinctive *Anlagen*, the lush impulsions within him, in fact all the emotionality and the crasser volitional faculties were so weak and inadequate and the unconscious subsoil of his soul so very shallow that he underestimated it in others and allows it almost no place in his system. His factual contact with life was faint and over small and widely separated surfaces, so he idealized in his aesthetics what he lacked in life. The tinglingly alive man exults through all the Kantian rubrics and in the envisagement of every aspect of nature and of life with a feeling of the supersensible substratum of it all. He does not need to see the world done up in song or framed in a picture in his study to appreciate it. Art only interprets what life means or ought to mean directly in and of itself and it does so only feebly and in patches. Beauty simply intensifies life, gives it all its relish and warmth and vital soul, sees both it and sublimity in all reality, in the meanest flower that grows, in all that lives and is. Isolation and undervitalization or both reserve these feelings for special fields.

Finally, do we feel a supersensible substratum more in beauty and sublimity in which with most laudable optimistic intent Kant reconstructed its avatar? Do we not rather feel it far more in those things that give us pain? Unpleasant are stronger and more varied than pleasant feelings and experiences and if there really be any sense of reality more coercive than another, it is that which we feel toward objects or facts that hurt us. It would therefore have been better

psychology for Kant to have said that tragic experiences reveal the supersensible substratum more clearly than the sense of beauty and sublimity can do. If Kant had located his sunken treasure of the *Ding an sich* in the tragic domain would not those who have since so diligently spaded for it have loosened up far richer soil? "Those who never ate their bread with pain know not the eternal powers" said the far more aesthetical Goethe. Is it not plain that where man has most transformed the world, viz., in industry, invention, discoveries, in social and political organization and throughout the whole struggle for survival in the natural as well as the moral world, which has decimated all species, man included, the sovereign master, pain, has been supreme? This is where pressure in foot pounds against reality has been hardest and not in the individual self indulgence and luxury of contemplating poetry, art, beauty and sublimity.

The other motif is Kant's argument that the beautiful and sublime are after all and at their best only symbols of the good so that as before religion now here aesthetics is ultimately resolvable into ethics. But what now becomes of his former argument that beauty is utterly disinterested and is thus distinct from the good in which we are supremely interested and which awakens the desire to realize it? How, if this is true, can morality be simply good taste in conduct? If the supreme beauty is goodness, we should be supremely interested in it and not disinterested and again, if in beauty we glimpse the supersensible substratum, why does he here reduce it to a mere symbol of goodness? This is surely a *contradictio in abstracto*. No reconciliation between these positions seems possible unless we assume that the *Ding an sich* of beauty is a symbol or type of a still more essential *Ding an sich* of virtue so that we have a hierarchy of entities. Moreover, beauty pleases, but pure oughtness can never please and remain pure. The only escape from this dilemma is to re-formulate on a more natural and modern basis the relation between the two and this involves a rather radical reconstruction of the whole Kantian procedure here. In fact, it is right to say that they are diverse, yet overlapping. There is an art for art's sake, as there is a duty for duty's sake. The difference is more fundamental than the identity. The Kantian beauty is all passivity and its goodness all activity. So each must get by as well as get on to the other (if slang may be applied to things so serious). The beauty of virtue is only seen in contemplating it and the act of doing it has no beauty to the doer at the moment. If it has beauty, it is only for

the beholder and if it has any for the doer, it applies to his deed as seen by him beforehand and afterwards.

Neither can be subordinated as means to the other as end, or as species to genus. One important distinction between them is that duty and the good are more closely related to the present and beauty to the past and future. Beauty consists subjectively rather largely in the awakening of reverberations from the past of the individual and of racial reminiscences in him on the one hand and of anticipations of the future, personal and racial, both of which must be of a predominantly pleasant character. Objects that recall ever so dimly paleo-psychic traces of what has lapsed to rudimentary states or organs in the soul or that awaken general tendencies not yet ready to flower, are beautiful. Thus beauty deals largely with two important classes of psychic objects, viz., vestiges of long ago and buds or promises and potencies of what is to be. This does not necessarily or usually involve any conscious memory or even *déjà vu* feeling. It is often quite impossible to distinguish the ontogenetic from the phylogenetic factor. It is this survival of often massed genera of experiences rather than specific occurrences that have tended to survival that is properly aesthetic. Lost chords are generally sounded again and the soul unconsciously remembers its lost paradise, that is, the best of its past experiences. Now, could we analyze these, they would probably be found to contain much of sex and its wider irradiations, for much of beauty has in the past been correlated with primal and secondary sex qualities and acts. Beauty is in no mean part made up of massed and confused echoes in the soul of what love has been and done in the world all along our line of forbears. It is of old, glowing, haloed, transfigured, a beautiful object. Love is not only the mightiest power of the soul, but the most persistent in the sense that its relics or engrammes are longest perpetuated, but it is also the most plastic, transformable and metamorphic of all. It can be base, sensuous or spiritual and felt toward the good and true as well as toward the beautiful, which contributes so much to give both the affective element. The study of sex aberrations shows that there is hardly an act in human life or an object in the world that cannot and does not in some pervert evoke specific erethism and it is due to this general diffusion and tendency of love in normal souls that it may suffuse anything with special significance for feeling, that is, it may sanctify, beautify or give conviction of truth or underlying noumena, for all of these love can do as nothing else can. And what

did Kant know of love? Without love, how much beauty would there be in the world? How its joys are diffused through woods, hills and vales, shores, mountains, morn, sunrise, sunset, twilight, moonlight, water and landscapes and all scenes in which its ecstasies have been set! It intensifies life, gives the world item by item its emotional view, makes life worth living because it has been and is possible again. In beauty, love is purged of desire and is often little but love of love, and the vast variety of objects from flowers to beautiful human forms are its best symbols, but everything can become so. It makes heroism, speaks through the individual, but is eloquent of the race which is always its real theme. This is the genetic and the prophetic aspect of beauty is hard by. Beauty is thus the sublimation of love and can be perfected only in the future in which, if at all, it will be its apotheosis. Thus, in all experiences of beauty, we step out of the present and to a great extent out of the individual life to expatiate over the wider racial field and recover what was lapsing over this almost boundless domain. The person touches the genus. In duty-goodness on the contrary, we take the issues of the race into the individual and more than that, focus on the *devoir des devoirs presents* and act in the living present. It is not now a question of contemplation, but of doing. We impersonalize ourselves more intensely rather than depersonalize ourselves. It is choosing between and executing deeds and it flourishes most not in quiet but in stirring times. Will takes precedence of feeling. Much, perhaps most, that beauty inspires is unrealizable in the life of the individual, but duty and moral goodness can and must ever be at least approximated. To do no evil is not enough. There must be achievement. The real saint is not idle as the beauty envisager may be. Sanctity and holiness are cheapened if called merely beautiful. The anchorites often outraged the aesthetic ideals of human life and courted ugliness, feeling that they did not belong together, but were opposed, for they thought life must be depurated of beauty somewhat as Kant thought the highest virtue must be of happiness, but they had no aesthetics even where the two could come together. Today we should hardly designate that life as beautiful that was devoted to the strenuous practice of virtue. Art may include, but it is more than morality taught by example. Thus the dear old little sage of Hinter Pomerania gave us neither paradigms nor rescripts for the relations of these two mighty potencies in the soul which our age can use.

Beauty is more closely connected with religion than with

morals, but not with Kant's narrow conception of religion. If beauty is *amor redivivus*, if it may be sublimated as Edwards taught even up into love of being so that "he prayeth best who loveth best," or focused in the great personified moral hypothesis of God, if the best form of worship is that which is the most aesthetic and if a large part of the work of religion in the world, especially Christianity, is to keep love pure, and since the church has inspired so much that is best in all the arts, it would seem that we are now compelled to seek for a deeper bond between them. The very pathologies of the two are akin. Let us begin by roughly characterizing religion as the *art* side, aspect or complement of morality. All its persons, states, places, events are artistic creations not so much of the great religious founders as of the folk soul. So far as genetic psychology can now see, religion is made up warp and woof of imagination. Of the might and dignity of the imagination, Kant knew almost nothing. But religion has always understood its potency and long ago cherished its highest moral function, faith, "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." No philosopher, save Froschammer, who thought the imagination actually cosmothetic or world-building, even began to do it justice and he treated it too much in what we must now almost call the vulgar epistemological sense which construes the world according to subjective or absolute idealism. Psycho-pathology is now realizing its power over health and disease. To say that God, devil, hell and heaven, immortality and all the rest are products of the ontogenic but still more of the phyletic imagination by no means is to assert that there are not real transcendent objects corresponding to them. On the contrary, we might argue precisely as Anselm, Descartes and so many others since have done, that because every race tends to evolve such objects we have a warrant to believe in their objective reality, else the soul is made to lie. This argument is just as pertinent for such products of the imagination as for those of reason. Their independent existence lies in the field of metaphysics or is at least metaphysical and thus belongs to another domain. A critique of these projections of the folk soul is now in order and must be forthcoming, but when it has done its perfect work, it will only sift out those mythopoeic products that are moral from those that are not, those that are universal, that are illy developed from those that are not, for they constitute the very essence of true religion. The hedonic narcosis of these moral art forms that the soul has felt toward Jupiter,

Thor, and Jehovah is worship (worth-ship) or the ascription of supreme value. The fashions in gods and in the interpretations of the God-idea or the attributes stressed change from age to age, more so perhaps than do tables of categories and certainly more than the best formulations of science. But under this change there is in these objectivizations always an essential core that abides. The changes in this domain are pragmatic rather than logical. All these cults, rites, ceremonies are only old conduct or forms of etiquette and deportment toward deities and hence they are imagined celestial morals. Religion thus beautifies and makes sublime the personifications of the system of virtues of those people who hold it. Thus, while aesthetics includes, as we saw above, only a part of morals, it embraces all of religion. Theology is the anthropology not of man so much as of the great and good section of humanity projected into the cerulean vault. It represents the best of mankind generalized and apotheosized and this is the product of constructive imagination, which makes up its very warp and woof and without which all the pure constructions made by the religious consciousness would, like the airy fabric of dreams, vanish and leave not a wrack behind. Only great and ethical geniuses can work transformingly in this field. What we find here is largely the result of masses of men working unconsciously and through generations. The Kantian logical reason is far too clumsy a tool to work with this material and only a psychology that has come out into the vast genetic domain has now begun to develop the methods and the conceptive apparatus which promise at last and ere long to do it justice. We post-Kantians have almost lost ourselves prowling in the narrow field of consciousness like Dutch patchers under the dikes of logic, which keep out the great sea of truth, but in these days the unconscious is coming to its rights and is bound, if not to be a trifle reckless, to indulge the imagination in making a periscope of possibilities, some of which will ere long become highways of science. The church invisible, the millenium, the judgment day, rewards and punishments and all that pertains to the fate of the soul at and after death, all modes of doing business with the gods and the gods themselves are products of the moral aesthetic, just as atoms, ions, ether, etc., are of the scientific imagination, and the criteria of the value of both is the same, viz., service. In both these realms we must walk by faith, not by sight. Thus, if in these pragmatic days we are learning that the old theory of knowledge and metaphysics was in large part an extravasation

of thought, the genetic psychologist in pronouncing its funeral panegyric must not forget that he owes to them a peculiar debt in that they have made possible a purely scientific treatment of the most sacred teachings of religion by discovering the noetic process of relegating all consideration of objective reality to another domain which he would not and cannot enter without ceasing to be a psychologist. They are like the extruded polar globules for him while he can study the pair that remains.

Further yet, the geneticist sees in the entire idealistic movement, from Berkeley on, only a propaedeutic for religious psychology. All that these thinkers proclaim concerning the phenomenality of the external material world they really meant of the religious cosmos. Their patent content, when psycho-analyzed, reveals as its latent content the fact that the *esse* of the spiritual world is its *percipi*, *cogitari* and *sentiri*. In fact, the power of the whole world of revelation, dogma and doctrine was fading and the idealists interpreted this *débauche* of faith objectively as a decline of external unreality. The geneticist must ask why they did thus misdiagnose and misinterpret impending spiritual bankruptcy and direct their scepticism toward the natural when in fact it was rooted in the spiritual realm? Why did the lush confidence of the physical science in this when the world of the religionist was fading, not suffer them to sleep, like the laurels of Miltiades? Certainly crude conscious jealousy is not a sufficient answer. We must look deeper for the true psychic momentum of this metathesis. The lover whose mistress has filled all his soul till everything in nature "'minds him of his Jean," when he feels her going away from him finds the world desolate and unreal. The morning song of the lark the rose, dawn and even twilight lose their charm and do not appeal as before. So the soul which, according to Augustine, supremely longs for God and if he is found rests in him, finds all nature transfigured and when God is lost, finds the world fading too. So in the last half of the eighteenth and the first part of the nineteenth century religion and the church, owing to the later results of the Protestant defection, were losing the dominant power they had so long wielded over the soul of man and an intellectual void and an atrophy of heart were superseding. The God-love of cultured Christendom was waxing cold as its object paled and the soul was distraught and disoriented far more and more deeply than it knew. The royal sentiment of conviction was passing over from the domain of faith to that of science. The ark of the

Covenant that held the decalogue was captured by the Philistines and must be won back, for they would never return it voluntarily, as was the case with the ark of old. As the very song of the sparrow erstwhile so cheering to the lover, threatens to break the heart of the rejected swain who would now silence it, so the apostle of the lost older *Pistis* and the newer losing *Gnosis* were tormented by the naïve confidence of observers and experimenters and so instead of reestablishing the spiritual world that had been shattered, they first made an aggressive and destructive raid against the camp of the materialists. But as I said, it was not the mere unconscious jealousy of the new organon of knowledge on the part of the baffled representatives of the old one. The latter like those who suffer from bodily diseases honestly mistook symptoms for a true diagnosis of the nature and cause of the disease. The world without God, heaven and the rest had lost its reality for them. Its old meaning was gone and they could not find or at least could not formulate a new and higher one, for this was the work of generations of thought and research. The faith-world had to be rebuilt slowly, step by step and so an interim scheme must be more hastily evolved to save the remnant of the provisional scheme till the day of new realization dawned. Thus the idealism of this age, later to be psycho-analysed in detail, vicariated for faith bankrupt and led into captivity in a strange land. Thus the objective world seemed phenomenal to those evicted from the old one which had been equipped with all the traditional products of the racial imagination before their psychokinetic equivalents in the form of the new statements was found. It took faith a long time to find and make a new home and equip it with new Penates with which the necessity of belief in some kind of creed could be met. The old idealism of the romantic speculation of the heroic age of modern philosophy was thus a regency and is not yet entirely ended, nor will be till genetic psychology is able to establish the old verities in forms palatable to modern thought, that is, to provide new and adequate proxy formularies.

Again, the old religion had glorified man by making him eternally perdurable in another world and as that great hope grew uncertain, he could not allow himself to be divested of this transcendental importance and so invested himself with a new halo of glory in the present world by making himself nothing less than the bearer or creator of it. Indeed, it was made of mind stuff to idealists. Never was such a regal crown offered to man as when his intelligence was made the

organon of all the categories, the maker and projector of the world of sense and even of gods. This was done as a consolation prize for his growing uncertainty concerning the next world. Plato said the soul was so marvelous a thing that even the gods could never have the heart to destroy it and somewhat in the same vein these philosophers, in making the mind cosmothetic and even theothetic, were atoning for a dim sense of loss, and seeking to meet the old need for wish-bred convictions in a new way. Both subjective and objective idealism conceive the human soul as the very apex of the universe. Instead of having his dignity conferred upon him by the gift of immortality man now puts on his own crown of dignity, which he deems so great that he may base upon it his assurance of an hereafter. Instead of being a stranger and an alien here bound for a heavenly home, epistemology made man the pampered petted spoiled child of this world, saved and preserved in the next because he so wanted and expected to be that he must not be disappointed. Indeed, he was too marvelous and precious to be annihilated. Meanwhile, there must be no rival with which the verities of the old faith even in its decline could be compared to their disparagement. Those dissatisfied with the ideal world must not be exposed to the temptation to turn away and gratify the passion to believe, which is so irresistible to every ingenuous soul, in the baser things of sense perception. Thus the speculators of this age were tempted to disparage the studies of the world because they could not solve its problems to the end and pass by strict methods all the way up the long road that leads from nature to nature's God. This they might have done had the biological, psychological and social group of sciences been developed, for in the light of their higher interpretation of even physical science, all would have been easier. The alternative then was either mathematics and physics or morals and religion. Now this gap is so bridged that there is no such alternative, but continuous passage, thanks to evolution, such that if the senses, which are so basal, are undermined the whole superstructure falls and he who attacks the witness of the eye or the ear imperils the kingdom of God. Sense is the fore-school and not the rival of the new faith and the Author of the world does not say one thing in the language of his deeds in nature and another in revelation, but both are parts of one consistent continuous whole, neither complete without the other. Everything in both fields is a problem to be even further investigated by kindred objective scientific methods. The idealists

perpetuated the old disastrous warfare between them which, as Mr. White's book has shown, is the tragedy of the Christian ages. They devised new weapons, fought the old battles in new and higher fields. The science of their day was not only narrow, but nearsighted, ever tending to crass empiricism or to formal deductive mathematical methods. Science then was utterly unable to cope with vital problems or to meet social needs. Hence the struggle that Kant sought to adjust was not ripe for adjudication and the terms of his truce seem now little better than learned scholastic jargon and those who study him too intensively as a finality are held up as it were in a past age, slaying the slain and crowning the victors over again. They are thus kept from vital touch with the living present. Miracles, inspiration, immortality and all these questions of our own and other faiths are now studied by psychologists natural-history-wise and also by analytical methods which chemists and engineers respect. Scientists have had the grace not to attempt to lay down laws of procedure to their philosophical colleagues, although they have the most venerable and trusted of all oracles, mathematics, on their side. The soul students on the other hand have not yet learned to forbear the wasteful and absurd effort to prescribe this for the former. In fact it is more to Kant's influence than to any other source that we still have the too common spectacle even today of young theorists of knowledge making pompous proclamation to scientists as to what they can, cannot, ought, ought not, know and do, what axioms, principles, concepts, methods they should use and laying down comprehensive surveys of scientific results and prescribing its logical canons on high *a priori* grounds, even for the laboratory. (I hesitate to mention a long and growing list of names and titles I have collected during the last five years of those who thus assume the right of eminent domain over the whole scientific territory; like the hero of a Gilbert-Sullivan opera enumerating another set of preposterous or typical faddists, "I have them on my list and they never would be missed." Better half a term of physics than a cycle of this Cathay!) Did any man of science ever profit by or even read of these erudite lucubrations, these solemn adjudications or high *cothurnus* injunctions which to those who do saturate their minds with them give the most vacuous of all the many forms of the conceit of knowledge without a suspicion or even the most diluted tincture of its substance?

The Kantian epistemology is thus only an attenuated or

sublimated continuation of the old warfare between religion or rather theology and science (which Draper and A. D. White have described) brought from the transcendental into the realm of immanent soul life. The old naïve Greek confidence in life and the pristine nearness of rapport with nature is here challenged in the interests of categories instead of supernal personalities and post-mortem states of existence. The old and crumbling partition in the soul between reason and empirical reality instead of being allowed to fall away and be forgotten is cobbled and patched up and the solidarity of interests and the intussusception of growths which now tends to go on between them have been retarded. The Kantians should profit by considering the fate of the old theologies and orthodoxies and this quaint system should henceforth be studied only historically and analytically as a precious product of the *Zeitgeist* of the past rather than of our own day, the interpretation of which latter is our crying need.

Before leaving this Critique, we may ask why we need to believe, for it is not, as James urged a *will* to believe, but something deeper which his type of mind (so blind to every evolutionary aspect of life) so tinglingly and completely expressed and confessed in his extraordinarily developed self-consciousness of his mental processes. The answer is, "We *must* believe, i.e., we must add *pistis* to *gnosis* largely if not chiefly because and just so far as we both as individuals and as members of a stirp are not yet fully developed but have a future greater than our past." Those on the other hand who represent the last stage of human degeneration cannot have faith, for everything for and in them has been realized, their entelechy attained. Every superstition, *Aberglaube* or extra or superfluous belief is instinct with the fore-feeling of greater things ahead. These things constitute the soul's feeling of being pregnant with the superman yet to be. They are taking and staking out squatter rights, preempting domains in new regions felt to be destined to become seats of empire later. But the last man exhibiting a later stage of human decrepitude and doddering old age will not have or find faith on earth, for faith is the spoon food to fledgling faculties which have not yet cut their teeth and can only mumble solid pabulum. Nascent stages of the soul's long upward viaticum need tenuous because tentative objects, platonic myths, even dogmas which they can believe because they are absurd, to keep the mental sutures from knitting together prematurely. They need a domain where they can flout reason and even its very best interpretations. Just here lie

the powers and potencies of the larger science that is to be. Every growing mind then ought to have one or more surds in its composition, if only used in the sense of what piano tuners call the "wolf" or the key into which all the discrepancies between the natural and the tempered scale are tuned. Thus science unsupplemented by imagination is a moribund thing, for the latter is the organon of the heart, which has in it not only greater but more dimensions than the intellect; and Kant was a pure thinker, almost a man without heart and moreover, the day of the study of feelings had not yet dawned. Yet as feelings are never to be repressed, they dominate, though only in the form of tendencies, or determinants, directing the form of about every position which Kant took, as psycho-analysis, which consists largely in finding the feeling motivations of thought, is beginning to show. These things really motivated all that what he called pure reason did.

Once more, the world will not accept any hard and fast distinction between what is true to live by and what is true *per se*. Science of course knows no such distinction. We do not easily accustom ourselves to the idea that certain things are verities and others that are at variance with them and utterly undemonstrable are true as postulates for conduct. We want to wear in our daily life mental goods that will wash and do up well in the laundry of reason. Otherwise morality lacks impetus and is falsetto. Such a schism is too much like the old distinction the church long made between the verities of reason and those of faith. It involves incipient duality of personality. We must know whether an author is talking in his first or in his second manner, voice or register. Pragmatism would obliterate this distinction by making practical truth not merely supreme but all, but pure reason and science can never be all reduced to practice, can never be entirely pragmatic, nor yet admit of two standards or criteria. Now Kant must have felt that his postulates were built upon foundations of sand and hence sought to compensate by the *Überdeterminierung* which appears in his compulsive and imperious categorical imperative and also by the very position he took that the practical was higher than the pure reason. This, be it noted, he did with of course perfect conscious sincerity and without being aware of the deeper motive but he could have done so with plenary conviction from the psycho-analytic standpoint. He was too logical a thinker not to be intensely subconscious of both his standardization and the handicap under which it made him

labor. The knight errants, it is said, often fought hardest and with the blindest abandon for a mistress whose reputation they dimly felt or even feared to be a little questionable, in order to fight down their own doubts by overcoming the authors or mongers of scandal. So too, on the same principle, young Mormons, if they show to the elders of the church the slightest signs of growing skepticism of their faith, are sent out as missionaries because it is realized that by convincing others they will most efficiently convince themselves. Thus Kant became most enthusiastic against his wont and temperament as a toreador of virtue because his oughtness lacked the sanctions of his logic. *Sustineo quae abstineo*. In the second Critique only he wrote a lapidary style or to change the trope his weft of thought is highly painted and embroidered by affectivity. After saying that freedom, God, immortality cannot be proven or disproven, he postulates them as the *only* basis and justification of virtue. Now, if an inquisitor of the old days had said, "Very good, therefore these must be enforced by an *auto da fé*" what would Kant have had to object? Rather must he need have applauded. If certain beliefs are essential to good conduct, even though they be ideas that ethical culturists deny, why must not such beliefs be enforced by the very same authorities and the same pains and penalties as the virtues to which they are basal? Again, one faculty of the soul cannot thrive when acting under the conviction of folly by another. We cannot think by one set of categories and act by another however named (principles and postulates). Hence here again Kant must be convicted of putting asunder (this time more violently than in divorcing the sensory and the understanding) what God or nature joined. To act *as if God*, soul and freedom were real is the nursery way of postulating Santa Claus, Jack Frost, the black man, the stork baby bringer, etc. More yet, these Kantian hypotheses are justified on the same principle as the rabbit's foot, the horse chestnut, the red yarn around the neck, which are true if, when, and in so far as they work well, that is, make the right tonic and therapeutic appeal to the imagination. Once more, if philosophy is the system of facilitations or *Bahnungen* connecting all parts of the brain and thought by methods of easiest and most rapid transit (making a degree of unity and efficiency of thought and conduct that is nearest to the standard always set by the economic operations of organic life where staff and line methods are best combined), then Kant falls below the standards already attained by empirical genetic psy-

chology, which knows no such schism, and his scheme for us as a whole is a clever curio but at the same time a serious warning to us, whatever we do, not to sin against the integrity of the soul. Its parts must be knit more closely together rather than disrupted. His is thus a dual, bifurcated, two-souled system and Hegel was right in accusing him of double housekeeping. One showed him to be a logician conjuring deftly with categories and the modes of the syllogism, while the other showed him to be a rarefied religionist whose theology, whose innate and early piety was distilled into rubrics of moral sanctions in which the dogmas are only sublimated or, to change the figure, adduced and used only as a set of collateral securities. Like Zarathustra he was alternately a denizen of two worlds, one of the cerulean blue of the true truth and the other the lower, turbid, murky world of accommodation to mortal needs.

Design, says Kant, is external, i.e., relative and mechanical; or secondly, internal and organic, i.e., where each part is at the same time end and means. Final cause cannot be explained mechanically in this latter domain. The opposition between the two theses—"all is mechanical" and "all is design" vanishes if both are conceived as only regulative or subjective and not constructive. We can never decide whether inner cause exists essentially in nature; we can only know that our judgment must regard nature as designed. To a mind that could not proceed discursively from part to part as we must, but which could look at all things intuitively and simultaneously rather than as proceeding from parts and individuals to the universe, or from the parts to a whole, etc., all nature would seem an *e pluribus unum* or as constituted by the same principle. Such a mind would not need nor indeed be able to form the idea of design.

Now if there is immanent design in nature or if immediate intuition of it is possible, then the standpoint of subjective idealism is transcended and his Critique of the faculty of judgment would be hardly less discrepant from both the other Critiques than they are from each other. What Kant only suggested here was taken up later by Schelling who severely criticized Kant's provincialism in philosophy, his ignorance of its history, even of Leibniz and Descartes, the unfitness of his scheme of things to be generally adopted, made cardinal and developed. In his first period Schelling himself taught that nature is visible mind and mind invisible nature, that there is absolute identity between them, that the same absolute ap-

appears in nature and in man, that there is no need of carrying over from one to the other, for nature is mind's *Doppelbild*. From these principles, Schelling derived the unity of all dualities and oppositions. Thus the objective world is independent and automatic and all knowledge is harmony of the subjective and objective. It is equally right to derive mind from nature and nature from mind. Matter is extinct mind which science and philosophy reanimate.

Kant was the first of the great quartette, the three latter of whom, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, all in diverse senses and degrees lay concealed in Kant and in whom he stood revealed. When these later systems declined, the cry was "back to Kant" with the feeling that his work at least would not have to be all done over again. Kant did his best to reason out a coherent view of the world, to make a catharsis of all superfluities of belief and to inaugurate a new type of consciousness that should crown man with a new dignity. He was not like Schelling, impelled to utter as fully as possible every stage of his own psychic growth, moulting system after system, as he documented successive stages of his development with little care for the consistency or the conformity of one with another, thereby affording the very best of all data in the whole history of philosophy for psycho-genetic study, Plato himself being, considering the uncertainty that still lingers concerning the order of his dialogues, inferior to Schelling in this respect. If Kant's theories about nebulae (which seem to have been connected in his mind with his utterly baseless conjecture of one central sun in the universe somewhere, perhaps Sirius) involved in any sense a fore-gleam of evolution, Schelling's scheme of the ascending orders of life, applied by Oken in greater detail to the animal series, gives a far more interesting picture of "evolution before evolution." We have seen how Schelling began his work just where Kant fell short of transcending subjectivism. Schelling was a prose-writing poet of nature and of her relations to man, ardent as Kant was frigid, sanguine as Kant was bilious, as the old phrenologists defined these terms. Fichte suggests the reincarnation of the old Hebrew prophet of righteousness—magisterial, magnetic, eloquent, uncompromising, soldierly, patriotic, and he aspired to be almost an infallible pope in the matter of morals. He too wove, cut and made a unique suit of habiliments that just fitted his soul and set thereby new fashions in the realm of *Sartor resartus* which a few even today affect. Given such a man as he and who knows that the future psycho-geneticist and analyst

may not be able to predict with considerable accuracy what sort of a speculative philosophy he would evolve! No system in the whole historic series of them must have made the gods so jealous as Fichte's, for his heaven-storming, world-creating ego seems to involve the unpardonable sin of the old Greek dramatists, that of rivaling heaven and thinking thoughts unfitting man's estate. Had Fichte lived under the reign of Zeus, he would have been blasted by his thunderbolts, or like Prometheus chained to a solitary rock. The most absolute of all egoists, he was in all his *thun* and *sagen* the embodiment of Kant's categorical imperative which set out to construct a mode of knowing the world that should be not unworthy the supreme dignity of man in it. Each man's essential self is the ultimate monadic *thing in itself*, to make it absolute is his sole duty and end in life and moral deeds are supreme above the achievements of speculation. To give duty priority over reason in his day when rationalism was almost a mania, placing it above even the categories is indeed to install it upon the very highest of all pedestals.

Hegel too lit his torch at the light Kant kindled. Instead of a dozen he postulated many more categories, he assumed that instead of being isolated and independent they were not to be assumed as originally given or created, but that they were products of an evolution which needed a new logic to explain it, that their developmental history must be given to show that they sprung from a single source and were so connected that when all the missing links were fully restored, thought could have an organic unity unknown before. It was to this end that a new method and logic were devised as a kind of logos or world soul. This slowly maturing ox-eyed Swabian, like his great Catholic prototype, St. Thomas Aquinas, sought thus to more than think God's thoughts after him, to rehearse his processes in creation and to be his interpreter to the world. Hegel's God was the superpersonal Absolute or God as he existed unrevealed before creation and independently of it, very God of very God, as pantheists conceive him. Hegel's logic is thus the genetic psychology of this supreme Deity who inhabits eternity, as he forever was, is and will be, who not only *did* make but *must* make time and space and all that in them is for reasons that can be fully set forth, for as fate rules Zeus, so Hegel's logic is not only a genetic derivation, and construction of God, but also the constitution by which he must act. The Hegelian web or diamond network of categories laid bare the system of necessity back of and determining every process of the absolute

Geist. Idealism could go no further and there remained nothing more to be explained. Thus in Goethe's phrase, all the garments we see God by were woven in the roaring loom of time or we might better add that the X-rays for the first time were turned upon and revealed the ipsissimal nature of God. Probably never in the history of the world (outside Catholicism at least) has any philosophical system been so influential or dominated all the special sciences as did that of Hegel in the day of his perigee. Each department of knowledge was assigned its place, its method prescribed, each scientist was told what he ought to do and could and what not, was told what his science really meant. Everything was inventoried, evaluated and many things transvalued. Did the culture world escape more narrowly than it knew from a new Protestant papal dominion, organized according to the principles of scientific measurements and efficiency inaugurated by this autocratic privy councilor, to whom the monarch's court and even office holders did homage and to whose ideas about all professors in all departments had at least to define their relations, which some of them did with almost courtierlike obsequiousness? Yet all this was only Kant's soul marching on. The little cloud in a spotless sky the day he died, which a soldier said was his soul, had indeed spread over the entire German sky. This cloud, if one may quote so vile a pun, as Tom Hood said of George the Third, rained as long as it could rain and then it mizzled, and it mists even yet.

When the three great post-Kantians (not to mention Schopenhauer here) slowly declined in influence and their kingdom of thought began to break up it was natural that their disciples should raise the cry—"back to Kant," for he was the focus to which so many lines before had converged and from which so many later diverged. He was the solidest of them all and the cloth of glory he wove had the firmest texture, the best warp and woof, seemed compared with others of good measure, a yard wide and, as has been shown, washed well. Hence arose the neo-Kantians and even the Kant philologists who treated his texts as exegetes treat Scripture codices. This new-old base line upon which the army of idealists had fallen back had to be reconstructed, intrenched, fortified, provisioned with new facts from the newly opened, well tilled and fertile lands of science which had meanwhile been very productive. Vaihinger, Cohen, Uphues, Watson, Hartenstein, Wallace, Morris, Porter, Knight and many others edited, résuméd, explained and made a new

aftermath of Kantian literature. Kant was the last stronghold of the old Teutonic ultra-idealism where the old guard must make their final stand and win or die. Inverting the law of megalomania and delusions of greatness as laid down in a masterly way by Magnan, the persecutors have become the persecuted and even I in this note am perhaps unconsciously and more than I know feeding fat the ancient grudge I bear the big four for absorbing so much of the energy of my own best years, which might have been better spent and for the waste of which I am myself an awful warning against this peculiarly inebriating speculative debauchery. Outside the specific professional holophrastic followers of Kant, today there are many still, even in psychological laboratories, who seek to make new blends of science and speculation and subject even experimental data to epistemological tests as irrelevant as theological soundness is to biology.

The days of this confusion are, however, happily ending. The first great step toward betterment was taken decades ago when the new school of the history of philosophy, represented by Trendelenburg, Fischer and Zeller began. Realising that the old symptoms had spent their force and could never be treated or regarded as finalities, the new canons of historicity aimed to set forth every system of the past as purely a product of its time and its author, and as directed chiefly towards its contemporaries. To regard it as pertinent to the present was deemed antiquarian and to make any one of the old systems supreme as a form of psychic arrest. As the higher criticism showed that the Hebrew prophets expressed only their own time and never predicted or sought to do so, so all these systems historians sought to offer up on the altar of the muse of history as dead products to be studied and reviewed only if we wish to revive the past.

Now, however, we are just entering upon a new and still higher third stage of reactions to these old systems, that of critical analytic psychology which seems destined to become the new queen in this domain. From its most advanced position, viz., that of geneticism, it is beginning to ask what speculators really meant by what they said, for if this can be found, they may after all have sense and meaning for us. Geneticism brings a new key to unlock deeper meanings, which will show that the processes and results of the old systems are really symbols demanding a new interpretation, that that which the authors thought they were doing and saying was very different from that which they were in fact doing and saying. The impending analysis of all the great systems

is the inevitable result then of the new dominance of genetic psychology and owes little, save terms and suggestions, to the Freudian analysis of neuropaths and yet we must do the latter ample justice and there is one very suggestive analogy and difference between them. As Freudians find sex, so our analysis finds religion at the root of all. Religion is a passion of the soul comparable in universality and intensity with sex, like it subject to and even made morbid by repressions. Like sex too, religion has left the soul full of its secondary qualities which it originated and inculcated, but has often left later to stand for themselves, so that their *de facto* religious origin is not apparent. As much all over the aesthetic field is due to the long circuiting of sex, so speculative philosophy is only the long circuiting of religion, and its sublimation into the intellectual field. As the root impulse of sex is to propagate another generation, so the root impulse of religion is to prolong the life of the individual by getting his soul born into another world. Both are forms of Schopenhauer's will to live, which is the *Grund-Trieb* of all life. Heaven is a product of the nest-building impulse, for our souls are to be reborn in this celestial world which the folk soul has created and made ready for them. God is a uni-personal dynasty that insures safe transit to and land-fall in a gloriously organized and permanent home into which he who dies is ushered so that life is thus made transcendently worth while in the *Jenseits*. Virtue is such conduct and regimen as will make us sure of immortality and of being well and not meanly born into the next life. Ceremonials are other-world conduct and worship is mindfulness of and heartening ourselves by the thought of this destiny. Offerings suggest that we must give up some objects of sense here to insure happiness hereafter. Theology is the philosophy of the next world and is pure pragmatism, judged from its own standpoint. The church is the insurance society that prescribes the moral regimen conducive to postmortem existence and well-being. The struggle for survival beyond is thus a mighty power and religion is a system of selective agencies. Like sex, it has manifold perversions and fanaticism, it is aggressive or sadistic, or it is quietistic, passive or masochistic. Both have their fanatics, perverts and inverts (cf. Morse). Now to psycho-analyse a philosophical system of the universe, we must first of all establish a set of symbolisms or psycho-kinetic equivalents. For a personal God, we must substitute an impersonal power that makes for righteousness, the great revealer of all things. His invisibility is translated as his metaphysical noumenal

character back of phenomena; for explicit revelation we read immanent laws; for heaven, the attainment of our highest desire or perhaps the ideal state of the future man here, the fulfilment always of fundamental wishes, the *summum bonum*; for the love of passion, the *amor intellectus dei*; for immortality, the intellectual intuition that participates in God by knowing his ways, and the deathlessness attainable here which is not, however, personal, for personality is a lower category; for demonstration of the reality of the ego, the immediate sense that we think (*cogito, ergo sum*), feel free and responsible, desire pleasure and are averse to pain, and push on from the empirical to the absolute ego; for Scripture, the tomes of the dialectic philosophers; for priestcraft, the craft of the system builders; for confessors, their ethical theorizations; for sects, schools of philosophy; for tables of the law, tables of categories; for vision, speculation, which means looking on the processional of either thought or things within or without us; for indoctrination, rationalization, the desire to understand, accept and live according to the systems; for the Holy Ghost or spirit of truth, the logos or logic of the world; for miracles, the necessity of surds and postulates to be assumed; for the church, the philosophers' state. With such keys we translate from the religious to the philosophic consciousness or vice-versa. Of course this list of equipollent terms is by no means as yet either accurate or complete. Of course too the philosophers did not realise that they were at root religionists, fighting over again the old battles with naturalism, only with new and newly named as well as improved weapons. They and the church were ships that pass in the night and each thought the other hostile. Just how much the noblest of all the doctrines of Kant—that of the categorical imperative or autonomous oughtness—he owed to his mother's teachings concerning the still small voice of the Holy Ghost; how much his characterization of the sublime, his sense of his own insignificance when he was stargazing, was due to the old magnificats of the Almighty who inhabited eternity; how much the satisfaction he felt in beauty was suggested by the ecstatic contemplative state of religious mystics; how his practical reason is faith in new terms; his phenomenalism motivated by the religious *vanitas vanitatum* of world-sick pietists from Solomon down; and indeed, how far his very subjective idealism that exalted man as the bearer of the world well up toward parity with the God who created it, was only construing into this life some of the pledges of glory that of old awaited man hereafter so as to realise at

least partially here from the securities fully redeemable only in the next world—all this is itself as yet only speculation. But, whatever theme we touch we shall, if I mistake not, find it to be essentially a restatement in new terminology of ancient religious notions, so that the whole of these systems is religion re-thought. In all their polemics against science and in their disparagements of nature, they were really defending the interests of the church and it is high time that the church should recognize its advance guard.

The demonstration of this thesis in detail is yet to be wrought out. It is of course not claimed that religion is pathological. The justification of the above general proposition can only be carried through by long, painstaking labor. The inhibitions of religion have been many and strong, like those of sex in hystericals, although these great men of course are by no means hysterical. But their religious consciousness and experience give us really the clue which we must follow. If we trace out in their systems all the substitutes, and transfers, patiently detect every complex *Verschiebung*, *Überdeterminiertheit*, *Verdichtung*, *Censur*, etc., we shall realise the underlying identity of their philosophy with religion. These idealists really sought to set forth the latest and most advanced form of religion and their chief merit depends upon whether or not their methods were right and their results with these efforts were useful. That is the criterion by which we must judge them. Their views were only the sublimation of the religious consciousness.

The key of Kant's philosophy is his person, his age and his habitat. Born, living and dying in a remote provincial city which he never once left more than a day's stage journey; knowing almost nothing of the great world by personal observation; leading the simplest, most regular and monotonous of all lives; a man with little physique, five feet tall; delicate in health, hygienically fussing, often almost hypochondriac, doctoring himself; strongly averse to the clergy as a class, never having entered a church during his mature years, despite the pious heritage of his mother, who died when he was thirteen; hardly less hostile to doctors whom he distrusted and still more so to lawyers; a bachelor and an insistent censor of woman and her ways, of whom, if all his sayings were gathered and coordinated, they would almost make a fourth critique; not even speaking to his own two sisters who were domestics, for twenty years, one of whom nursed him in his last days of most distressing decrepitude; never having seen an art gallery; of humble origin, the son of a strapmaker, and

poor all his life till his wretchedly paid professorship at the age of 46 did give him the means of living comfortably with great economy; knowing almost nothing of science, save physics and mathematics together with a little geography and a gossipy anthropology, on all of which he lectured before he turned to philosophy; mostly ignorant of Greek and caring little for music, save that of the military bands in his garrison city which the young soldiers whom he lectured much liked; idolized during his later life; formal, methodic; loving the companionship of his inferiors, and excessively deferential to his superiors as seen in his often fulsome dedications, rather the fashion of his day; inept with men of the world; amazingly ignorant as has been abundantly shown of the history of philosophy, even that just preceding his own day;—he rather naturally became the embodiment of criticism, which was the very spirit of his age by which he was caught up, for it was a day when reason was the academic as in the days of the French Revolution it had been made the popular goddess. Kant might almost be called the leading representative and the mouthpiece of the *éclaircissement* of his day. Every institution and every type of culture and belief were being subjected to revision and criticism, but reason meant deductive logic and science meant physics and mathematics, while philosophy meant metaphysics. Kant knew the world only intellectually and through the medium of books and he saw it only in the dry light of intellect. For his *Gemüth* or emotionality, life was almost undeveloped, save in and from few directions and in these but slightly, and his academic seclusion was almost isolation from the world of action. His deeds, which Carlyle says are the only actions of complete men, consist in thinking in his study with his eyes almost hypnotically focused upon the distant church spire, so that he was upset when it was hidden by the twigs of a growing tree, or upon the brass button of one of his students which had to be restored before he was able to lecture well again. He was old when he was young in years and what little youth he ever experienced was in the form of a certain limited mellowness and second childhood as he grew old. Senescence was hard on him and his faculties decayed, one eye even growing blind twenty years before his death at the age of eighty. He had become petulant, physically emaciated, a quaint little mannikin, pestered by trifles, positively worried over the attentions his great fame had given him and over his letters. Yet he was comfortable to the end and his extreme and rigid economy revealed to the amaze-

ment of every one an estate of nearly \$16,000 and a library of 500 volumes.

To conclude, Kantianism is one of the antique cumbersome systems of regarding the world that belong only to the museums of the history of philosophy. It is not a scheme for our time and to install its antiquated gearing in eager and youthful minds very greatly reduces their efficiency for the world's work to-day. Its thought machinery is wasteful, very ponderous and requires immense mind power to run it. To change the trope, it is like an old battle ship that did good service in its day, but should be drydocked, because afloat it is a derelict and a menace and no one who knows what a modern warship is and can do would think of embarking in it, but would be content to visit and inspect it as a curious relic of bygone days. A few of its timbers are marvelously sound and can be built into new constructions, but as it stands in Hartenstein's eight volumes, it is utterly unseaworthy. Kant restated many of the eternal verities of religion in terms that made them more efficient for the culture of his day, so that he marked a distinct stage of advance. Modern pragmatism is stating the same old truths in a still more effective way which approximates still further towards the scientific standpoint. But even pragmatism, which decants this old wine of meaning into still newer bottles, makes them more appetizing to the scientific palate and should be heartily welcomed as a further step towards closing the chasm between religion and science, while it has immense significance and amounts indeed to a new dispensation for the old speculative philosophies, has no significance whatever for science to which it has nothing to tell, to give or teach, for from the very start, science has been through and through pragmatic. Indeed, the most advanced pragmatism is only a dilution of scientific principles with speculative and religious tinctures. It is simply a fresh step in the auto-therapy of culture illustrating the *vis curatrix animi*. For science, it still contains some of the old virus of alienation. From direct, close, immediate intuition of facts and things it directs observation not to nature but to the process by which we know it. It involves introversion or introspection of activities that should not be subjected to consciousness, which interferes with their perfect operation; it is like the anxious examination of the patient's own heart, stomach, liver, eyes, etc., the subjectivization of which is impossible and unnatural with perfect circulation and digestion. Pragmatism is at best then a movement which lies entirely within

the field of epistemology, which is itself of only limited and qualified value, but this new movement is one towards its sanification in that it is a little less tainted with hypochondria. True science has always been and must forever be pragmatic, but is liable to be injured if it becomes conscious even of this fact. Pragmatism has reduced the percentage of inefficiency of both subjective and absolute idealism, but is itself much below the standard of efficiency set by science. It is simply the philosophy of pedagogy transfigured, glorified and given a new name, taught by new disciples. It sets forth the rationale of adjustment to nascent stages and recognizes that even cultivated adults are only children of larger growth. Like pedagogy, it is genetic rather than logical, but science in its higher modern sense, including the study of all that is in physical nature, in man, religion, etc., both requires and illustrates a higher standardization and a greater efficiency. We may thus safely conclude that from this point of view, it is high time that the present widespread academic cult of Kant and his successors in academic institutions be greatly reduced, since the excessive cult of this method is not only wasteful of the best thing life has to give—youth and enthusiasm—but is pernicious.